Essays on Industrial Organization by Caoui, El Hadi
UCLA
UCLA Electronic Theses and Dissertations
Title
Essays on Industrial Organization
Permalink
https://escholarship.org/uc/item/2b08p91w
Author
Caoui, El Hadi
Publication Date
2019
 
Peer reviewed|Thesis/dissertation
eScholarship.org Powered by the California Digital Library
University of California
UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA
Los Angeles
Essays on Industrial Organization
A dissertation submitted in partial satisfaction of the
requirements for the degree Doctor of Philosophy
in Economics
by
El Hadi Caoui
2019
c© Copyright by
El Hadi Caoui
2019
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Professor John William Asker, Chair
This dissertation consists of two essays in the area of Industrial Organization.
In Chapter 1, I investigate the role of network effects in explaining the within-firm
rate of technology adoption. I study the conversion of movie distribution and exhibi-
tion from 35mm film to digital technology. These industries constitute a hardware-
software system with indirect network effects. I specify and estimate a dynamic
oligopoly game of digital hardware adoption by movie theaters and digital movies
(software) supply by movie distributors. Crucially, theaters’ technology-adoption de-
cisions are made at the screen level so diffusion occurs both within and across firms.
Counterfactual simulations establish that: (1) at the industry level, diffusion occurs
mainly within rather than across firms; (2) differences in technology adoption across
firms, which are commonly attributed to scale economies and strategic incentives,
are in part due to larger firms’ ability to initially adopt the technology at a smaller
scale. Therefore, explicitly accounting for intra-firm adoption dynamics is important
to better explain aggregate diffusion and firm heterogeneity in technology adoption.
In Chapter 2, I study how non-cartel firms adjust their pricing to the supra-
competitive level sustained by a cartel, and in doing so, may harm consumers via
so-called “umbrella” damages. Such damages arise, in particular, when contracts are
awarded through first-price procurement auctions. This chapter examines the bidding
ii
behavior of non-cartel firms bidding against the Texas school milk cartel between
1980 and 1992. Evidence is found that the largest non-cartel firm bid significantly
higher when facing the cartel. Structural estimation of damages and inefficiencies
due to the cartel agreement reveals that per contract: (1) damages from non-cartel
firms overbidding are at least 47% of damages caused by the cartel, (2) when the
outcome of the auction is inefficient, damages due to misallocation amount to 64% of
cartel damages. Finally, inefficiencies raise the winner’s cost by 3.7%. These results
shed light on the potential importance of umbrella damages from a civil liability
perspective.
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INTRODUCTION
This dissertation consists of two papers relating to the field of Industrial Organization.
The first examines the role of network effects in technology adoption, focusing on the
within-firm margin of adoption. As an illustration, I study the conversion of the
movie industry from 35mm to digital. The second studies “umbrella damages,” a
type of damages caused to consumers when non-cartel firms adjust their pricing to
the collusive level sustained by a cartel. The common thread throughout this work
is the focus on classic questions of the Industrial Organization literature, such as
the relationship between technology adoption and market structure (i.e, firm size
distribution and concentration levels), and collusion between competitors in product
markets.
The first chapter is motivated by the empirical observation that technological in-
novations diffuse over time, not only across firms, but also within firms. I contribute
to the understanding of within-firm technology adoption by quantifying the role of
network effects. Network effects arise when the benefit from adopting an innovation
depends on the number of other firms adopting it. Focusing on the movie industry’s
conversion from 35mm film to digital technology between 2005 and 2014, I collect
panel data on movie theaters’ decisions to adopt digital technology. I specify a dy-
namic model of technology adoption by movie theaters, and calibrate it to the data.
This allows the simulation of counterfactuals. The analysis show that technological
diffusion within the firm is an important factor affecting the speed of industry-wide
diffusion. Additionally, the ability to gradually adopt the innovation favors larger
firms, and explains a significant fraction of the adoption time lag between small and
large firms.
Chapter 2 aims attention at a potential collateral damage of cartel agreements.
The latter are agreements between rival firms to cooperate and raise prices rather
1
than compete. Such agreements harm consumers and cause “damages” to efficient
production allocation. This chapter argues that firms which are not part of a cartel
agreement can also adjust their pricing to the level sustained by a cartel, harming
in the process consumers who do not buy directly from the cartel. Such “umbrella
damages” broaden the scope of the overall damages caused by the cartel. The Texas
school milk cartel in the 1990s is used as a case study. Estimates of umbrella damages
indicate that they constitute a significant fraction of overall cartel damages.
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CHAPTER 1
Intra-Firm Technology Adoption under Network
Effects: Evidence from the Movie Industry
1.1 Introduction
Innovations contribute to economic growth only insofar as they are broadly adopted
by firms. Understanding the factors affecting firms’ adoption decisions is therefore
essential to devise effective policies encouraging the spread of new technologies. One
such factor are network effects, which have been the object of an extensive empirical
literature. This literature focuses mainly on the inter-firm adoption margin by as-
suming firms make 0–1 adoption decisions or by studying firms’ first adoption. By
contrast, this paper investigates how network effects drive the intra-firm margin of
technology adoption, that is, the rate at which a new technology replaces the old
technology within a given firm. The objective is to evaluate how the latter margin
contributes to industry-wide diffusion and shapes the relationship between market
structure and technology adoption.
The importance of analyzing this margin appears at two separate levels. First, if
intra-firm diffusion constitutes the main driver of industry diffusion, policy aiming at
accelerating adoption should explicitly target inefficiently slow diffusion within firms.
Second, differences in adoption across firms that are attributed to scale economies and
strategic interactions may, in fact, be better explained when accounting for intra-firm
adoption dynamics: In an environment with network effects, capital indivisibilities
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amplify the positive link between firm size and early adoption.
The study focuses on the conversion of movie distribution and exhibition from
35mm film to digital cinema in France, between 2005 and 2013. Digital cinema
consists of distributing motion pictures to theaters over a digital support (internet or
hard drives) as opposed to the historical use of 35mm film reels. To screen digital
movies, theaters must equip their screens with digital video projectors instead of film
projectors: The two technologies (digital and film) are incompatible.
Digital cinema is well suited for analyzing the role of network effects in intra-firm
technology adoption for two reasons. First, the movie distribution-exhibition indus-
tries constitute a hardware-software system with indirect network effects (Katz and
Shapiro (1985)). Adoption of digital projectors—the hardware—by theaters is con-
tingent on the availability of digital movies—the software—supplied by distributors.
Conversely, software availability depends on the hardware installed base.
Second, indirect network effects lead to intra-firm technology diffusion (i.e.,within
theaters). Indeed, the benefit of replacing a film projector with a digital projector
can initially be small because of the limited availability of digital movies. As a
consequence, it is only optimal for a given theater to initially convert a small fraction
of its capital stock of screens to digital projection. As the industry-wide share of
screens equipped with digital projectors grows over time, so does the availability
of digital movies. The latter in turn further increases theaters’ marginal benefit
from adoption, and leads to the process of technological diffusion within theaters.
According to industry professionals, network effects were a major factor affecting
adoption.
This mechanism applies more generally to other industries. A recent and still
developing example is the trucking industry’s adoption of electric vehicles (hardware),
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which depends on the availability of charging infrastructures (software).1 At a given
point in time, a trucking firm’s rate of adoption of electric vehicles will reflect the
overlap between its distribution routes and the network of available charging stations.
The paper leverages three novel datasets: (1) a panel recording adoption of digital
projectors at the theater-screen level, as well as information on local market conditions
and theater characteristics, (2) a time series of hardware prices, and (3) a time series
reporting the share of movies distributed in digital.
To quantify the contribution of the intra-firm margin to aggregate diffusion and the
cross-sectional heterogeneity in adoption, I specify a structural model and simulate
counterfactuals shutting down this margin. Theaters’ technology-adoption choices
are modeled as a dynamic oligopoly game, allowing for rich theater and market het-
erogeneity. Every period, theaters choose the number of screens to equip with the
digital projection hardware, given their competitors’ adoption decisions, the adop-
tion cost, and the availability of digital movies. In turn, the availability of digital
movies depends on the number of digitally equipped screens in the industry. Because
network effects are at the industry level, with a few hundred theaters adopting, this
framework generates a particularly high-dimensional state space. To alleviate the
computational burden, the paper assumes firms condition their adoption decisions on
moments summarizing the industry state, rather than all possible realizations of it:
the equilibrium concept employed in this paper follows the moment-based equilibrium
defined in Ifrach and Weintraub (2017).2
Theaters’ single-period profits are estimated using the two-step estimator of Ba-
jari, Benkard, and Levin (2007) (hereafter BBL (2007)). By recovering the equilibrium
actually played in the data, this approach allows me to deal with equilibrium mul-
tiplicity, a prevalent issue in games with network effects. The estimation approach
1See “How Tesla’s first truck charging stations will be built” - Reuters 02/01/2018
2This framework has been used in recent empirical work by Jeon (2017) and Gerarden (2017).
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exploits differences in adoption behavior across theaters (e.g., differences in adoption
times, units of new technology acquired, and adoption costs) to estimate how theaters
and market characteristics affect single-period profits.
Using the estimated model, the paper first evaluates the extent to which industry
diffusion is driven by intra-firm diffusion. The equilibrium industry diffusion (i.e.,
variance in adoption times across all screens) is decomposed into an intra-firm and
inter-firm margins. To separate the two margins, a counterfactual diffusion path is
simulated, restricting every theater’ adoption-strategy space to a binary 0–1 adoption
decision. In this sense, theaters are restricted to converting their entire capital stock
of screens at once, conditional on adoption, thus shutting down the intra-firm margin.
Importantly, theaters take the aggregate share of digital movies over time as given
in the equilibrium played in the data: this approach, therefore, computes a counter-
factual best-response.3 The analysis shows aggregate diffusion (i.e., the dispersion in
adoption times across capital units) is mainly explained (69%) by the diffusion within
rather than across theaters.
Second, the analysis moves from the industry to the local market level. The
estimated model is used to evaluate the role of the intra-firm margin in explaining
the observed heterogeneity in adoption rates across firms. Such differences have been
historically attributed to two important factors: firm size (economies of scale) and
market concentration (strategic incentives).4 The objective is to isolate the role of
the intra-firm margin from the latter two factors. The intra-firm margin plays a
role because large theaters are able to initially convert a smaller fraction of their
stock of screens than are small theaters. It is optimal to do so due to the presence
3A counterfactual best-response is sufficient to decompose the equilibrium aggregate diffusion rate
into an intra-firm and inter-firm margins. While interesting in itself for welfare analysis, computation
of counterfactual equilibria is complicated by multiplicity.
4Differences can also arise due to heterogeneity in firm characteristics (type of programming,
integration etc.) which the model allows and controls for.
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of indirect network effects: the benefit from adopting depends on the availability of
digital movies, and initially, only a small fraction of movies is released in digital. As a
result, larger theaters and more concentrated local markets (i.e., markets with fewer
theaters, keeping the total stock of screens fixed) introduce the technology faster—all
else equal.
The introduction lag, or difference in expected time to first adoption between a
small and large theater (resp. between a competitive and concentrated market), is
simulated under (1) the equilibrium adoption strategy played in the data and (2)
the counterfactual best response outlined above (intra-firm margin shut down)—in
a given local market, fixing theaters and market characteristics. By comparing the
introduction lags simulated under adoption strategies (1) and (2), one can isolate the
role of the intra-firm margin from other factors (scale economies, strategic interac-
tions). For the average urban local market with more than 100, 000 inhabitants, a
significant fraction of the introduction lag (30% to 42% for small/large theaters, and
43% to 69% for less/more concentrated market) is due to the intra-firm adoption mar-
gin. Therefore, in addition to economies of scale and strategic incentives, intra-firm
adoption dynamics are an important factor explaining differences in adoption behav-
ior across firms and shape the relationship between market structure and technology
adoption.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. The next section reviews the lit-
erature and highlights the main points of departure from it. Section 1.3 presents
the movie distribution and movie exhibition industries, describes the technology and
highlights the specificities of the French market. Section 1.4 describes the data and
gives preliminary descriptive statistics. Section 1.5 quantifies the magnitude of in-
direct network effects via reduced-form analysis. Section 1.6 develops the dynamic
model of technology adoption. Section 1.7 estimates the industry model. Finally,
section 1.8 presents the counterfactual analysis.
7
1.2 Related Literature
Previous empirical work estimating the extent of network effects in technology adop-
tion has focused mainly on the inter-firm (or extensive) margin, modelling adoption
as a 0–1 decision. This approach is appropriate when adopters are end-consumers
with a unit demand for the technological good or when, in the case of firm adoption,
the technology is not embodied in capital. Recent examples in the case of consumer
goods include video games platforms (Clements and Ohashi (2005), Corts and Le-
derman (2009), Dube´, Hitsch, and Chintagunta (2010), Lee (2013)), DVD players
(Karaca-Mandic (2003)), and home computers (Goolsbee and Klenow (1999)). More
recently, Ryan and Tucker (2012) studies the diffusion of videocalling within a multi-
national firm. In their model, the within-firm rate of adoption is measured by the
number of employees using the technology, with each employee making 0–1 adoption
decisions; network effects arise within the firm.5
In the case of firm adoption, examples include the US Fax market (Economides and
Himmelberg (1995)), Automatic Teller Machines (Saloner and Shepard (1995)), elec-
tronic switching in the US telecommunication industry (Majumdar and Venkatara-
man (1998)), and the Automated clearinghouse payment system (Gowrisankaran and
Stavins (2004), and Ackerberg and Gowrisankaran (2006)). In contrast to this liter-
ature, this paper analyzes the extent to which network effects, at the industry level,
determine not only whether the technology is adopted, but also how the intra-firm
adoption rate is affected.
I also contribute to the literature analyzing the drivers of intra-firm technology
adoption. The development of this literature has been limited by the lack of detailed
data at the unit of capital level. In order to observe the intra-firm spread of an
5Note that in all the aforementioned papers, except in the cases of home computers and video-
calling, network effects are indirect. This type of network effects have been formally modelled by
Chou and Shy (1990), and further developed by Church and Gandal (1992). Recent theoretical
contributions include Markovich (2008), and Markovich and Moenius (2013).
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innovation, each firm has to be observed over long time periods since the date of
initial adoption. Intra-firm adoption was first analyzed in Mansfield (1963), who
studies railroads’ conversion from steam to diesel powered locomotives. In this model,
a new technology diffuses within the firm as the risk attached to the payoff from this
technology is reduced over time through inter-firm and intra-firm learning. Other
empirical studies based on the learning approach include Nabseth and Ray (1974),
Romeo (1975), Levin, Levin, and Meisel (1992), and Fuentelsaz, Gomez, and Polo
(2003).6
Recently, alternatives to the learning model were proposed. In particular, Bat-
tisti and Stoneman (2005) propose stock effects as an important driver of the time
intensity of intra-firm adoption, using the case of Computer Numerically Controlled
Machine tools within firms in the UK engineering and metalworking sectors.7 Other
studies following this approach include Hollenstein (2004) and Hollenstein and Wo-
erter (2008). This strand of the literature relies on cross-sectional survey data and is
constrained to estimating the effect of firm- or environment-specific factors on inter-
and intra-firm adoption at a given point in time. By contrast, this paper relies on
a panel of adoption decisions for all firms active in a given industry, and explicitly
models the dynamics of stock effects.
This paper makes a contribution to the literature on market structure and in-
novation (including technology adoption). The recent research on this topic builds
dynamic structural models and simulates the effect of competition on innovation (e.g.,
6A literature on the ”depth” of adoption considers the intensity of use of a given stock of new
technology. One example is Astebrot’s (2004) study of the effect of learning sunk costs. The depth of
adoption differs from the intra-firm margin of adoption, in that the stock of new technology adopted
is fixed while the extent to which this stock’s technological capabilities are exploited varies.
7The stock-effect approach argues intra-firm diffusion will not be instantaneous, because the
marginal profit gain from increased use of new technology decreases with use. In their case, the
decreasing marginal returns from further adoption are implied by a Cobb-Douglas specification of
the production function (implying decreasing marginal productivity of capital embodying the new
technology).
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Goettler and Gordon (2011), Igami (2017), Igami and Uetake (2017)) or technology
adoption (Schmidt-Dengler (2006)). This paper follows this methodological approach
and analyzes how market structure, and in particular firm size, can impact the timing
of technology adoption specifically via the intra-firm margin.
Finally, this paper contributes to the empirical literature studying the movie in-
dustry. This literature has considered many facets of the industry: the effect of
vertical integration (Gil (2008)), seasonality (Einav (2007)), strategic entry and exit,
and spatial retail competition (Davis (2006a),Davis (2006b), Takahashi (2015), Gil,
Houde, and Takahashi (2015)), and the quality-variety trade-off in screening brought
about by digital projection (Rao and Hartmann (2015)). In the strand focusing on
technology adoption, the closest paper is Gil and Lampe (2014), who analyze Holly-
wood’s conversion to color in the 1940s-1950s. Another related paper in this strand
is Waldfogel (2016). The latter paper studies the effect of digital movie production,
alternative distribution channels (streaming), and online film criticism on new prod-
uct releases. The present paper focuses on the digitalization of the movie distribution
and exhibition sectors, with theater releases as the main channel of distribution.
1.3 Industry Background
This section describes the movie-distribution and movie-exhibition industries before
and after the advent of digital technology. It presents costs and benefits of digital
cinema from the perspective of distributors and exhibitors, and discusses the effect
of digital cinema on movie ticket prices and quality. Finally, this section highlights
specificities of the French distribution and exhibition markets and important stylized
facts.
10
1.3.1 From 35mm Film to Digital
For most of the 20th century, movies reached viewers after going through a series
of specified steps in a vertically structured industry. After the movie is shot and
produced, distributors print the movie onto 35mm film reels and ship the reels to
movie theaters. At the theater, a projectionist inspects the print, attaches the reels
together, and positions them so they can be fed to the screening platter of a film
projector. When the movie’s run is over, the print is broken back down into shipping
reels and either sent to the next theater venue or returned to the distributor.
On January 19, 2000, the Society of Motion Picture and Television Engineers, in
the US, initiated the first standards group dedicated to developing digital cinema. The
technology would entail (1) movie distribution on a digital support (via the internet
or hard drives), instead of the historical uses of film reels and (2) movie projection
via digital projection hardware instead of the film-projection technology.
To screen a digital movie, theaters must equip their screens with digital projec-
tors. Four manufacturers supply digital cinema projectors worldwide: Sony, Barco,
Christie, and NEC. The average list price of a digital projector (in 2010 euros) was
e88, 000 in 2005, e50, 000 in 2010, and e40, 000 by 2012. In addition to the digital
projector, a digital cinema requires a powerful computer known as a “server.” A dig-
ital movie is supplied to the theater as a digital file called a Digital Cinema Package
(DCP). The DCP is copied onto the internal hard drives of the server, usually via a
USB port.
Digital projection automates all the technical tasks that were previously performed
by the projectionist. Unskilled staff can control the playback of the content (movie
featured, trailers, ads), the projector, sound system, auditorium lighting, and tab
curtains through automation cues in the server.
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1.3.1.1 Distributors’ supply of digital movies
Digital distribution of movies drastically cuts printing and shipping costs for movie
distributors. To print an 80-minute feature film can cost US$1,500 to $2,500 per
print. By contrast, a feature-length movie can be stored on an off-the-shelf 300GB
hard drive for $50.8 In addition, hard drives can be returned to distributors for reuse.
With several hundred movies distributed every year, the US distribution industry
saves over $1 billion annually.
1.3.1.2 Exhibitors’ adoption of digital projectors
Digital projection allows exhibitors to cut down on operating costs. Screening film
prints is a technical task, requiring mechanical skills that are growing rare. Film
projectionists are commonly represented by powerful unions and are therefore expen-
sive.9 By contrast, operating a digital projector is a simple task: untrained staff can
easily compose a playlist and launch a projection as on a regular computer. One
consequence is that uncertainty about the benefits of the technology and learning,
which are usually thought of as important determinants of intra-firm diffusion, are
not central to adoption decisions. Digital projection also opens up the possibility of
using theaters for aˆalternative contentaˆ such as pop concerts, opera broadcasts, and
sports events.
8The latter figure of $50 does not include the price of encryption-key generation, transportation,
and storage, which add approximately $200–$300. For French/European movies, these figures are
around e950 for film print distribution and around e350 for digital print distribution, including
shipping, encryption-key generation, and storing.
9 See interview in l’Obs 07/14/2010 (in French) “Frederic, projectionniste chez UGC pour 1800
euros par mois” The collective bargaining agreements set the minimum monthly salary to e1, 500
over the period of interest.
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1.3.1.3 Multi-homing by movie distributors and theaters
Multi-homing in movie distribution consists of the distribution of a given movie on
both film and digital supports. It was initially very common: most movies released
in digital format were also distributed on film. As the technology diffused, the share
of multi-homed movies decreased toward 0.
Multi-homing in movie exhibition refers to equipping a given screen with both
a digital and film projector. This type of multi-homing was rare for practical rea-
sons (limited space in screening booth, heavy and sensitive projection equipment),
and because theaters laid off their projectionists following the adoption of digital
projection.
1.3.1.4 The Virtual Print Fee system
A large fraction of the cost savings from digital cinema is realized by distributors. For
this reason, theaters have been reluctant to switch without a cost-sharing arrangement
with movie distributors. An agreement was reached with the Virtual Print Fee (VPF)
system. The VPF system was born in the US market and was rapidly adopted in the
rest of the world. Under this system, the distributor pays a fee per digital movie to
help finance the digital hardware acquired by the theater. The VPF contract would
typically cover 50% of the hardware adoption cost; the rest has to be paid for by the
exhibitor.
1.3.1.5 Impact on ticket prices and movie quality; and the role of 3D
Excluding 3D movies, the film-digital quality differential was small enough not to
warrant any impact on ticket prices.10 Although 3D movies, and in particular Avatar
10As noted by Davis (2006a), theaters’ ability to set ticket prices is constrained by distributors’
incentives. Because the conversion to digital distribution affected mainly the cost of a movie print,
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(released in the winter 2009, grossing $2.7 billion worldwide), were initially a major
selling point for digital projection, exhibitors quickly realized it was not expanding
the audience as promised.11 The vast majority of movies released over the diffusion
period were in 2D.
1.3.1.6 Welfare implications
Although the paper does not discuss welfare, digital cinema is expected to increase
consumer surplus by reducing the cost of making movies. A first consequence of such
reduction in costs are wider releases with increased access for theaters located in small
and rural markets. Second, cost reductions in movie making will lead to new product
entry.12
1.3.2 The French Distribution and Exhibition Markets
1.3.2.1 The French Exhibition Industry
The French exhibition industry is fragmented, with a large fraction of small theaters.
Figure 1.1 represents the distribution of theaters by size, defined as the number of
screens owned by the theater. Half of the theaters are mono-screen. An additional
15% are two-screen theaters. The largest theater chains by share of total screens in
2014 (end of the diffusion of digital cinema) are Gaumont-Pathe (13.6% of screens),
CGR (7.8%), and UGC (7.5%). These three chains make up 50.1% of total box
which is a fixed cost from the point of view of movie tickets, it did not significantly impact ticket
pricing.
11See Bordwell (2013).
12Aguiar and Waldfogel (2018) show that if product quality is unpredictable at the time of invest-
ment (as is typically the case with cultural products such as movies), new product entry can have
large welfare benefits.
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office revenue.13 In the early phase of the diffusion period (in 2007), these shares
were: Gaumont-Pathe (12.1% of screens), CGR (7.1%), and UGC (7.0%). Market
shares were relatively stable over the diffusion period. The French exhibition industry
experienced small entry and exit rates over the diffusion period (around 1.5% per
year). As a result, the majority of digital projectors acquired were replacing old film
projectors, enabling the analysis of intra-firm adoption decisions.
Figure 1.1: Distribution of theaters by size (number of screens)
1.3.2.2 The French Distribution Industry
The French distribution industry is less concentrated than its US counterpart. In
2014, for example, the four-firm concentration ratio was 35.2% in France and 57.4%
in the US. Over the diffusion period 2005 − 2014, US movies had an average 47%
market share (of total box-office revenue), French movies had a 39% market share,
13See Kopp (2016).
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and European and other nationalities made up 14% of the box office.14 An important
point to note is that US studios distribute their movies via national subsidiaries
(e.g., Universal France or Warner Bros. France). Subsidiaries tailor their advertising
and distribution campaigns to the national market they operate in. Therefore, the
support—film or digital—over which US movies are distributed in France depends
primarily on the installed bases of film and digital projectors in France.
1.3.2.3 The VPF and Government Subsidies
In the US, the VPF system was the result of bilateral negotiations between distrib-
utors and exhibitors. This was initially the case in France as well, until a law was
passed on September 2010 making VPF contributions mandatory: any movie distrib-
utor willing to distribute digital copies of its movie must pay a fixed fee to the theater
booking the digital copy. As in the US, the VPF would go toward covering 50% of
the digital projector cost, the rest being paid by the exhibitor.
Government and regional subsidies to small theaters were another important fea-
ture of the hardware-acquisition process in France. Many small “continuation” the-
aters, which receive movies only two or three weeks after their national release, did
not generate enough VPF to be able to acquire the digital-projection hardware. The
government, along with the regions, stepped in to help these theaters finance their
digital conversion. These aids were allocated to theaters that owned less than three
screens and were not part of a chain controlling 50 screens or more.
1.3.2.4 Art House Theaters
French theaters can acquire the “art house” label if they screen a minimum share
of independent and art house movies. This share depends on the theater location
14Based on CNC 2014 annual report.
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(market size). The label, awarded every year, entitles the theater to government
financial support (in the form of a lump-sum subsidy). A priori, operating profits
may differ for art house theaters compared to non-art house theaters. Therefore, art
house theaters may differ in their adoption behavior.
1.4 Data and Descriptive Statistics
This section describes the data and presents descriptive statistics. The data contain
information on theaters’ digital-adoption decisions, theater characteristics, adoption
costs, and availability of digital movies over time. This information is used to study
the role of indirect network effects in driving within-theater adoption of digital.
The main dataset is a panel describing digital adoptions by theaters. This dataset
was collected from two sources: the European Cinema Yearbooks published by Media
Salles, and an online database maintained by Cinego, a private digital platform.15
Both sources are public and provide snapshots of the digital-exhibition industry at
different time periods spanning June 2005 through March 2013, in France. Thirteen
dates are obtained from the Cinema Yearbooks, and 5 dates from the Cinego database.
At each of the 18 observation dates, the number of digital projectors acquired is
known for every active theater. The observation dates and source are detailed in
Appendix A.1. Figure 1.2 represents the 18 observation dates along the industry
share of screens equipped with digital projection. As seen in this figure, the panel is
aperiodic (starting in 2008) and stops before the diffusion is complete in 2014. Five
periods are dropped to ensure a relative periodicity in the sample (6 months). Details
about this procedure can be found in Appendix A.1.
Two auxilliary datasets complement the main adoption panel dataset. The first
15Raw data available at: http://www.mediasalles.it/yearbook.htm and
https://cinego.net/basedessalles (via the Internet Archive)
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Figure 1.2: Observation times (vertical lines) for the diffusion of digital projectors
is obtained from the French National Center of Cinematography (CNC hereafter).
The CNC dataset provides a rich set of information on theaters’ characteristics, local
market demand, and the share of movies available in digital, between 2005 and 2015.
More precisely, this annual dataset contains: (1) lists of all active theaters, (2) the
number of screens, the number of seats, the address, the owner’s identity (theater
chain, individual), and art house status for each active theater, (3) market population
(categorical) at the urban/rural unit level (defined below), (4) the share of movies
released in digital (distributed partially or entirely in digital), and (5) in 2015 only, a
categorical variable for ticket sales (e.g., “150,000 to 200,000 tickets sold”), number
of movies screened, total number of screenings, shares of movies screened that year
by type (art house vs. non-art house), and by nationality (US, France, Europe, and
other) for each active theater.
The second auxiliary dataset, obtained from the European Audiovisual Observa-
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tory, provides time-series information on digital-projector acquisition costs.16 Namely,
the time-series for the hardware adoption cost is constructed by adding (1) the price
of a digital projector (net of VPF contributions) to (2) ancillary costs. The time-series
for digital-projector prices is based on a survey of projector manufacturers. Actual
prices paid by specific theaters are not public due to nondisclosure agreements be-
tween theaters and manufacturers. This time-series is taken as representative of the
“list” price (or manufacturer’s suggested retail price MSRP) of digital projectors. The
analysis accounts for the VPF subsidies, which cover 50% of the projector price.17
Ancillary costs include the price of other equipment (the server and the digital sound
processor), Theater Management software, and labor costs (installation). Estimates
of ancillary costs were collected by the European Audiovisual Observatory, but are
only available for 2010. In the analysis, these ancillary costs are assumed to have
stayed constant over the sample period. This assumption seems reasonable for labor
costs. According to the Observatory, price declines for the server and digital sound
processor are more limited than for the digital projector. The hardware-adoption cost
is adjusted to 2010 constant euros.18. The hardware adoption cost is interpolated to
obtain estimates at the 13 observation dates. Figure 1.3 shows the time series for this
variable.
The analysis is conducted on the data after the following preparation. Itinerant
theaters, which account for 5% of active theaters, are dropped. Because the focus is
on firms’ decision to convert existing capital from film to digital, theaters that enter
during the diffusion period already equipped with digital projectors are excluded
16See ”The European Digital Cinema Report - Understanding digital cinema roll-out” (Council
of Europe, 2012)
17Although the law mandating VPF subsidies was only enacted in September 2010, it was retro-
active. Moreover, anecdotal evidence indicates that pre-2010, the majority of projectors were pur-
chased under VPF agreements. The model will assume digital projector-purchases before 2010
benefited from VPF subsidies.
18The GDP Implicit Price Deflator for France is used.
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Figure 1.3: Hardware adoption cost
from the model. Their contribution to the overall installed base of digital screens is,
however, accounted for and taken as exogenous. Firms exiting before conversion to
digital are also excluded.19 Rates of entry and exit are, however, low (around 1.5% of
firms enter or exit every year). Theaters in French overseas territories are excluded.
The final sample includes 1, 671 theaters, located in 1, 169 markets (urban or rural
units, defined below), and observed over 13 dates between June 2005 and April 2012.
The sample covers 87% of all non-itinerant theaters located in Metropolitan France,
which were active in 2005 or entered before 2008 equipped with the old technology.
A description of variables used in the analysis is shown in Table 1.1.
19The inability to convert is, however, not a significant cause for exit, because the CNC and
regional governments subsidized digital adoption for the smallest and less financially sound theaters.
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Table 1.1: List of variables
Type Variable Description
Movie theater digital screens: sit number of screens converted to digital by time t
screens : Si total number of screens
seats average number of seats per screen
art house equals 1 if art house theater
chain identifier of movie theater chain
competitors d-screens competitors’ digital screens by time t
competitors f-screens competitors’ film screens by time t
box-office* number of tickets sold (annual - categorical)
art house movies* share of art house movies
screenings* total number of screenings
Market demand region identifier for the 22 administrative regions
market size identifier for: Paris, Paris inner suburbs (”petite couronne”)
Paris outer suburbs (”grande couronne”),
urban unit with more than 100 thousands inhabitants,
urban unit with 20 to 100 thousands inhabitants,
urban unit with less than 20 thousands inhabitants and rural
Digital projector adoption cost: pt list prices for 2K digital projectors
(including VPF subsidies and ancillary costs) in 2010 euros
Movie distribution digital movies ht share of movies released in digital format
Note: The first three categories in market size (Paris and suburbs) are colinear with the regional dummy for ”Ile-de-
France”, the latter is therefore excluded. * variables only available for 2015
Local Market Definition and Competitors
Local market demand and competition is defined with respect to the urban or rural
unit in which the theater is located. An urban unit is defined by the INSEE, the
French National Statistics Office, for the measurement of contiguously built-up areas.
It is a “commune” alone or a grouping of communes that form a single unbroken
spread of urban development, with no distance between habitations greater than 200
meters, and have a total population greater than 2,000 inhabitants. Communes not
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belonging to an urban unit are considered rural.20 In 2010, Metropolitan France
contained 2, 243 urban units and about 33, 700 rural units.
For the largest cities (Paris, Lyon, Marseille), the urban unit division is not appro-
priate, because the resulting local markets are too large. In these cases, the relevant
market within each city is the “arrondissement” (equivalent to zipcode in the US).21
In the rest of the paper, a theater’s competition is measured using the number of
competing screens in the same local market.
Descriptive Statistics
The analysis focuses on theaters with at least four screens, due to the prevalence
of government and regional subsidies for small theaters (fewer than three screens).22
Table 1.2 and 1.3 report cross-sectional summary statistics, and highlight the market
and firm heterogeneity captured by the data.
Table 1.2 shows summary statistics for the 399 theaters with at least four screens.
A significant fraction of these theaters, 33%, are art house theaters. The average
theater has eight screens, and 1, 538 seats. Thirty-five percent of theaters are part
of the three largest theaters chains: Gaumont-PathA˜ c©, CGR, and UGC. In total,
53.4% of theaters are miniplexes (4-7 screens) and 46.6% are multiplexes/megaplexes
(8 screens or more).
Table 1.3 reports summary statistics by market type. Paris and its suburbs are
controlled for separately because attendance rates are significantly higher in the cap-
20Communes correspond to civil townships and incorporated municipalities in the US.
21The subdivision by arrondissement is arbitrary, given that theaters are engaged in spatial com-
petition. However, the use of a distance measure instead to define a firm’s rivals (in which the
relevant market is theater-specific) would make the dynamic model intractable.
22These subsidies covered part or all of a theater’s adoption costs. This restriction allows the paper
to avoid having to model firms’ beliefs regarding the distribution of future government and regional
subsidies (and subsequent increase in the number of digitalized screens). Although the model does
not formally include subsidized firms, their adoption decisions will matter for the aggregate diffusion
of digital projectors: their contribution to the network of digital screens is accounted for but assumed
to be exogenous to the model.
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Table 1.2: Summary statistics (theaters with at least 4 screens)
Variable Minimum Mean Maximum Std. Deviation
Theater characteristics
Screens 4 8.118 23 3.736
Seats 112 1, 538 7, 408 961
Art House 0 0.336 1 0.473
# Competitors (theaters) 0 3.118 14 3.414
Theater size (indicators)
Miniplexe (4-7 screens) 0 0.534 1 0.499
Multi/Megaplexe (8 screens or more) 0 0.466 1 0.499
Theater chains (indicators)
UGC 0 0.083 1 0.276
Gaumont-Pathe´ 0 0.168 1 0.374
CGR 0 0.103 1 0.304
Per screen cost of 56, 176 68, 366 84, 000 8, 800
digital conversion (in 2010 euros)
Table 1.3: Summary statistics by market size (theaters with at least 4 screens)
Theaters Markets Theater size Art house Screens per Screens per
(mean) (share) market (mean) market (sd)
Urban unit - >100k inhab 174 101 9.167 0.213 15.792 8.431
Urban unit - 20 to 100k inhab 126 116 7.024 0.563 7.629 2.986
Urban unit - <20k inhab and rural 17 17 6.647 0.647 6.647 3.552
Paris 37 15 7.189 0.135 17.733 9.565
Paris - inner suburbs 18 18 9.222 0.278 9.222 4.977
Paris - outer suburbs 27 26 7.926 0.185 8.231 4.320
National 399 293 8.117 0.337 11.055 7.262
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ital compared to national averages.23 As expected, the stock of screens grows with
the market size. A larger fraction of theaters are art house in rural areas, because
the CNC’s threshold requirements to qualify are lower for relatively less dense ar-
eas. Theater size increases on average with market size (except for Paris, where the
scarcity of space limits theater size).
Preliminary analysis of the data shows that the intra-firm margin is quantita-
tively important at the aggregate level, and that there is substantial heterogeneity in
adoption rates by firm size.
Figure 1.4a shows the number of new digital screens equipped per year. Figure
1.4b decomposes this number into: (1) screens installed by new adopters (theaters
with no digital screens in t−1), and (2) screens installed by theaters with some digital
screens by t− 1. (1) is informative about the degree of inter-firm adoption, whereas
(2) is informative about the degree of intra-firm adoption. Starting in 2008, a large
fraction of screens converted to digital per year belong to theaters that have already
adopted at least one digital screen in previous periods, highlighting the importance of
the intra-firm margin. An alternative way of measuring the contribution of intra-firm
adoption is to decompose the sample variance in adoption times across all screens in
the industry into within-theater and between-theater variances. The former sample
variance is 1.28 (corresponding to a standard deviation of 1.13 years), the latter is 1.02
(or a standard deviation of 1.01 years). Therefore, within-theater variance in adoption
times explains about 56% of total variance across all screens in the industry.24
With respect to firm heterogeneity in adoption, figure 1.5 shows the share of digital
screens over time for theaters grouped by size. Larger theaters adopt the technology
faster (i.e., there is a first-order stochastic shift of the adoption path as firm size
23Moviegoers in Paris visit theaters on average 12 times a year, compared to a national average
of 4− 5 times over the diffusion period.
24This likely underestimates the contribution of the intra-firm margin because the panel stops
before the end of the diffusion.
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Figure 1.4: Inter- and intra-firm decomposition
(a) New digital screens (b) Decomposition: Inter/Intra-firm
Note: “Inter-firm” corresponds to screens installed by new adopters (no digital screens by t − 1).
“Intra-firm” corresponds to screens installed by theaters with some digital screens by t−1. Subsidized
theaters (3 screens or fewer) excluded.
decreases). On the one hand, this pattern can be due to size-related factors affecting
theater’s profits and adoption costs. In particular, theaters of varying size might
differ in their characteristics (type of programming, ownership), in their competitive
environment, and in profits per screen if economies of scale are important. On the
other hand, capital indivisibilities at the screen level can also explain the initial lag
in adoption of small theaters: if the share of digital movies is initially small, theaters
have an incentive to initially convert a small share of screens to digital. Hence, only
the largest theaters are able to adopt at the margin. To distinguish the contribution
of capital indivisbilities from other potential factors explaining the delay, a structural
model is needed. Before describing the model (section 1.6), the next section presents
reduced-form evidence for the magnitude of network effects in this industry.
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Figure 1.5: Aggregate share of digital screens by theater size
1.5 Reduced-Form Analysis
The anecdotal evidence garnered from industry professionals suggests indirect net-
work effects are at play in the diffusion of digital cinema. This section provides
estimates of the magnitude of these network effects. The analysis focuses primarily
on hardware adoption, because of the richness of the data there. The results indi-
cate that digital-movie availability is an important variable affecting theaters’ digital
hardware adoption. This variable will therefore be an important component in the
structural model analyzed in the rest of the paper.
As noted in Gowrisankaran and Stavins (2004), network effects (whether direct or
indirect) are difficult to identify using only time-series data because the adoption cost
is decreasing over time while the network size is increasing over time. Disentangling
both effects is challenging.
The effect of digital-movie availability on theaters’ adoption of digital projectors is
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identified here by leveraging differences in movie programming between art house the-
aters and commercial theaters. The underlying assumption is that art house theaters’
adoption of digital projectors would depend on the availability of digital art house
movies, whereas commercial theaters’ adoption would depend on the availability of
digital commercial (non-art house) movies. At a given period t, both types of theaters
will face the same hardware adoption cost but different digital-movie availabilities,
giving cross-sectional variation in this latter variable.25
A theater is defined as an “art house” if at least 80% of the movies it screened
in 2015 were art house movies. A theater is defined as a commercial theater if at
most 20% of the movies it screened in 2015 were art house movies.26 This definition
is preferable to the use of the “art house” label awarded by the CNC every year (and
observed in the data), because thresholds to qualify for the award can be as low as
30% in small urban and rural markets. The preferred definition allows for better
identification of theater’ type but has the disadvantage that data on the share of art
house movies screened by the theater are only available for 2015. The share in 2015
is assumed to reflect the average share of art house movies screened by the theater
over the diffusion period 2005 − 2014. The validity of this assumption rests on two
observations. First, the data show that no changes occured in theaters’ CNC-defined
art house labels over the sample period. Art house theaters tend to maintain their
art house label, whereas commercial theaters do not turn into art house theaters.27
Second, the share of art house movies released per year remained relatively constant
25Differences in digital-movie availability for art house and commercial movies stems from het-
erogeneity among distributors. Distributors of commercial movies (e.g., the majority of US studios)
started distributing on digital earlier than smaller art house distributors.
26The quantitative results (documented below) are robust to both relaxing and restricting the
thresholds used to define art house and commercial theaters.
27One reason for the stability in art house labels is that art house theaters receive state aid, which
acts as an incentive to maintain their programming.
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between 2005 and 2015.28 In particular, the conversion to digital did not have an
impact on it.
Because the share of art house (resp. commercial) movies released on digital
are not directly observed in the data, the reduced-form analysis assumes that the
latter variables can be proxied by the share of art house (resp. commercial) screens
converted to digital across the industry. Details on how these two variables are
constructed are presented in Appendix A.2. This assumption is valid if the availability
of digital movies is driven by the installed base of digital projectors. In addition to the
anecdotal evidence stating so, the assumption is buttressed by regressing the share
of movies released in digital on the industry share of screens equipped with a digital
projector, instrumenting the latter by the hardware-adoption cost, and controlling
for year fixed effects. The results indicate the installed base of digital projector has
a positive and significant effect on digital-movie availability.29
The reduced-form model relates the share of digital screens in theater i to: (1) the
industry-wide installed base of (art house or commercial) screens, (2) the adoption
cost, (3) firm characteristics (number of screens and seats), and (4) market character-
istics (market size, competitors’ screens). Denote by Si the total number of screens
in theater i, and by sit the number of digital screens in theater i by period t. The
dependent variable is the share of screens converted to digital sit/Si. The analysis
focuses on non-adopters’ incentive to adopt, so only the case of first adoption is con-
sidered; that is, the dependent variable is sit/Si conditional on sit−1/Si = 0.30 Capital
28According to statistics compiled by the CNC, the share of art house movies released per year
fluctuates between 55% and 62% between 2005 and 2015. The average share is 58.7% over the
sample period. Over the diffusion period, on average, 25% of US movies released in France are art
house, whereas this share for French movies is 68%. See Bilan 2015 at http://www.cnc.fr/web/
fr/bilans/-/ressources/9217573
29A 1% increment in the industry share of digital screens (instrumented by digital projector prices)
implies a 1.51% increment in the share of movies released in digital.
30Every period, only theaters that have not yet adopted are included in the regression.
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indivisibilities imply that the dependent variable is discrete and can take values in
sit/Si ∈ {0, 1Si , 2Si , ..., 1}.
Let xit be the list of regressors including the aggregate share of digital art house
or commercial screens, the adoption cost, theater i’s number of screens Si, number
of seats, CNC-defined art house label, competitors’ digital screens, and competitors’
film screens.
An ordered probit model relating the discrete dependent variable sit/Si to xit is
estimated by maximum likelihood. The sample is restricted to art house and com-
mercial miniplexes (4–7 screens). The periodic sample with 13 dates is used, and
it contains 42 art house theaters and 111 commercial theaters.31 Table 1.4 presents
the estimates of the ordered probit model under three specifications: (1) is the base-
line specification, (2) includes dummies for regions, market size, chain membership,
box-office revenue (in 2015), and (3) includes theater-level random effects.32 In all
specifications, year fixed effects are included. An ordered logit specification, included
in Appendix A.2, predicts effects of similar magnitude.
The results indicate that the share of digital art house (resp. commercial) screens
in the industry has a significant and positive effect on art house (resp. commercial)
theaters’ own adoption of digital screens. The effect of a 10% increment in the
industry share of art house (resp. commercial) digital screens on the probability of
adoption is represented in Figure 1.6a as a function of the initial industry share of art
house (resp. commercial) digital screens.33 An increase in the share of digital screens
from 50% to 60% increases the probability of adoption by approximately 10%.
31Multi and megaplexes (8 screens or more) are excluded because the majority are commercial
theaters.
32Focusing on first adoption might lead to selection of theaters over time. The inclusion of theater
random effects alleviates this concern.
33Marginal effects are evaluated at the mean and are obtained by summing marginal effects on
the probabilities of converting non-zero shares of digital screens sit/Si > 0.
29
Table 1.4: Share of screens converted sit/Si conditional on si(t−1)/Si = 0 (ordered
probit)
(1) (2) (3)
Estimate s.e Estimate s.e Estimate s.e
Industry share of d-screens 2.392∗∗ 1.219 2.896∗∗ 1.263 2.425∗∗ 1.131
Adoption cost -2.557∗∗ 1.002 -2.623∗∗ 1.043 -2.714∗∗ 1.018
Own screens 0.053 0.055 0.062 0.059
Seats -0.085 1.176 -0.288 1.302
Art house 0.024 0.130 0.021 0.138
Competitor d-screens 0.013 0.010 0.012 0.011 0.013 0.010
Competitor f-screens -0.004 0.004 -0.005 0.004 -0.004 0.004
Year FE Yes Yes Yes
Region FE No Yes No
Market size FE No Yes No
Chain FE No Yes No
Box-office FE No Yes No
Theater RE No No Yes
Observations 1, 563 1, 563 1, 562
-log Likelihood 391.292 373.626 384.251
AIC 816.584 805.251 798.502
Note: ∗∗∗p < 0.01 ;∗∗p < 0.05; ∗p < 0.1. d-screen = screen equipped with a digital projector.
f-screen = screens equipped with a film projector. For market dummies, the omitted category is
“urban unit with 20 to 100 thousands inhabitants.” For the chain dummies, the omitted category
is “single firm and small chains.”
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Figure 1.6: Effects of the industry share of digital screens and adoption cost on the
probability of adoption
(a) Effect of an increase in the share of digital
screens
(b) Effect of a decrease in the adoption cost
Notes: Panel (a) shows the effect of a 10% increment in the industry share of digital screen, on the
probability of adoption, evaluated at the mean, as a function of the initial industry share of digital
screens. Panel (b) shows the effect of a one standard deviation decrease in the adoption cost on the
probability of adoption evaluated at the mean as a function of the industry share of digital screens.
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The hardware-adoption cost exerts a negative and significant effect on the proba-
bility that a theater adopts. Figure 1.6b shows that a one-standard-deviation decrease
in the adoption cost (corresponding to e6, 500) increases the probability of adoption
by approximately 55%—when 50% of screens in the industry are digital.
In summary, these results indicate the magnitude of the network effect is signifi-
cant. A given art house (resp. commercial) theater’s likelihood of adoption responds
to the share of art house (resp. commercial) movies released in digital, under the
assumption that the latter variable can be proxied by the installed base of art house
(resp. commercial) digital screens across the industry. The section relies on anecdotal
evidence and a time-series regression to support this assumption.
1.6 Industry Model
This section presents the dynamic structural model. The model will be subsequently
used to guide the estimation and recovery of theaters’ operating profits under the film
and digital technologies. These profits are required to study the role of the intra-firm
margin, by simulating counterfactual adoption paths.
Theaters’ technology adoption choices are modelled as a dynamic oligopoly game
in the tradition of Ericson and Pakes (1995). The central part of the model specifies
how theaters make their technology adoption decisions—both at the inter-firm and
intra-firm margins—as a function of their type, the adoption cost, their rivals’ adop-
tion decisions, and the availability of technology-specific complementary goods (film
or digital movies). Theaters adopt digital projectors for two reasons: (1) to be able
to screen movies exclusively released on digital and (2) for cost-reduction purposes.
For the distribution market, a reduced-form model is used. This part of the model is
meant to capture, for a given movie to be released, a distributor’s decision regarding
on which support to distribute it (film and/or digital), given the technology-specific
32
network size (number of screens equipped with film/digital projectors). Finally, an
equilibrium of the distribution-exhibition industries is specified. In equilibrium, the-
aters convert their screens optimally to digital projection, given their information
sets and beliefs about future states, and these beliefs are consistent with theaters’
adoption decisions and distributors’ optimal choices of distribution format.34
1.6.1 Adoption of Digital Projectors by Theaters
Time is discrete and infinite. A period corresponds to six months.
Firms: A firm is a movie theater. There are I firms indexed by i ∈ {1, ..., I}. This
set is fixed throughout the game: no entry and exit occur.
Firm state space: Firm heterogeneity is reflected through firm states. In period t,
the individual state of theater i ∈ I is a vector denoted by xit ∈ X . Firm state xit
is decomposed into (τi, sit, zit):
• τi is a vector representing theater i’s type, which is fixed throughout the game.
τi includes firm size Si (number of screens), local market characteristics (market
size, denoted marketi, and number of competitors’ screens, denoted S−i), art
house label arti ∈ {0, 1}, and a chain identifier chaini ∈ {0, 1, ..., C} (with
chaini = 0 if i is not horizontally integrated).
• sit ∈ {0, 1, ..., Si} represents the number of screens converted to digital by the-
ater i, by the beginning of period t. The remaining Si − sit screens operate
using the film technology.
• zit is a vector containing theater i’s competitors’ types and digital screens.
This vector is at the local market level (urban or rural unit in which theater i is
located), and differs from the industry state, which is at the national level and
34All vectors are denoted in bold.
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defined below.
Let the industry state, yt, be a vector over individual firm states that specifies,
for each firm state x ∈X , the number of firms (across the industry) at x in period t.
Focusing on symmetric and anonymous equilibrium strategies, this definition of the
industry state is without loss of generality. Let S =
∑
i∈I Si denote the total number
of screens in the industry, and let st =
∑
i∈I sit denote the total number of digital
screens in the industry in period t.
Theaters that are part of the same chain are assumed to make their adoption
decisions independently. This assumption is motivated by the fact that modelling
adoption at the chain level is computationally burdensome: each chain’s state should
record firms’ states for all theaters part of the chain. The resulting chain state vector is
high-dimensional.35 This modelling assumption is discussed in more length in section
1.6.3.
Transition dynamics: A theater can increase its number of digital screens, sit, by
paying an adoption cost. If firm i converts ait screens to digital in period t, the firm
transitions to a state sit+1 given by
sit+1 = sit + ait for ait ≤ Si − sit (1.1)
There is no uncertainty in state transition. A theater’s state sit is bounded above by
its maximum capacity Si.
Aggregate adoption cost: The aggregate adoption cost process, {pt, t ≥ 0}, includes
the digital-projector price (net of VPF contributions) and ancillary costs, and is as-
sumed to follow a finite Markov process, independent of all previously defined quan-
tities:
pt = pt−1 + ηt−1 (1.2)
35The chain adoption state vector for Gaumont-PathA˜ c© (70 theaters) has dimension 1,088,430—
assuming all theaters have four screens and ignoring theaters’ types and rivals states.
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where ηt−1 is a discrete random variable, i.i.d across periods, with a non-positive
support. Denote by P(pt+1|pt) the corresponding Markov kernel. This process reflects
technological advances in the manufacturing of digital projectors, as well as learning-
by-doing and scale economies, which exogeneously decreases the hardware adoption
cost over time. It is publicly observable to all firms.36
Firm-specific adoption cost: The per-screen adoption cost for theater i in period t is
the sum of two components:
pt + it (1.3)
where pt is the aggregate adoption cost and it is a theater-specific shock, drawn from
a normal distribution N(0, σ2). This theater-specific shock is privately drawn at the
beginning of each period and is independent across periods and theaters.
Before defining theaters’ single-period profit function, the relationship between
the share of digital movies, and st, the number of digital screens, must be specified.
This is done by considering distributors’ technology-choice problem.
Availability of digital movies: Every period, a continuum of mass M of movies
is released. Movies are short-lived and are screened by theaters for one period. Let
hdt denote the share of movies available exclusively in digital format in period t, and
hft denote the share of movies available exclusively in film in period t. Denote by
hmt = 1− ht− hft the share of multi-homed movies (i.e., distributed on both film and
digital).
The share of multi-homed movies, hmt , is not observed in the data (only h
d
t + h
m
t
is observed). In anticipation of the estimation section, and to keep the exposition
concise, the rest of the model is derived under the “no multi-homing” assumption:
hmt = 0 for all t. As a robustness check, the model is also derived and estimated
36The exogeneity of the price process can be relaxed. For example, the transition matrix of the
process can depend on the stock of digital screens in the industry: P(pt+1|pt, st). The simpler
specification is imposed due to the limited amount of data available to estimate this transition
matrix (only time series information used).
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under the polar “wide multi-homing” assumption, hdt = 0 for all t. The qualitative
findings, included in Appendix A.3.2, are robust to this assumption.
For the rest of the analysis, define ht ≡ hdt so that 1−ht = hft . The share of digital
movies, ht, is assumed to depend on the share of digital screens in the industry at
the beginning of the period.37 Let
ht = Γ(st/S) (1.4)
denote distributors’ reaction function giving the share of movies released in digital as
a function of the industry-wide share of digital screens.38
Theaters’ Single-Period Profit Function: The single-period profit of theater i
(net of the adoption cost) in period t if it adopts ait units of digital hardware is given
by
Π(xit, pt, ht, ait, it) = pi(xit, ht)− ait(pt + it) (1.5)
where pi(xit, ht) are theater i’s operating profits (screenings, concessions, advertise-
ments) in period t, which depends on the firm state xit and the shares of digital
movies ht, and ait(pt + i,t) is the total cost of converting ait screens in period t.
Operating profits, which are not observed in the data, are specified via reduced-
form and estimated. Namely, pi(xit, ht) is obtained by aggregating profits per movie
screening across all movies the theater is able to screen given its stock of digital and
film screens. The technologies being incompatible, a theater can screen a digital movie
only if it has a digital screen. A theater lagging in its adoption of digital will have
fewer movies to screen over time, because as the network of digital screens grows, an
increasing share of movies is only available on digital.
37This approximation is made for tractability. Because distributors share box-office revenue with
theaters, and this revenue differs across theaters, distributors might base their decision not only on
the aggregate number of digital screens, but also on the identity of the converted theaters.
38This simple specification for the relationship determining ht can be relaxed to account for other
exogenous determinants of the share of digital movies. It is imposed due to the limited amount of
time-series information necessary to fit the relationship.
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It is assumed that, every period, theater i randomly draws a mass Mi ⊂ M of
movies from the mass M released in that period. By the law of large numbers, a
share ht of movies drawn are digital movies. In particular, every theater draws the
same share ht of digital movies per period.
39 Denote by Ri the number of screenings a
theater can host if it is able to screen all Mi movies drawn. The number of screenings
Ri is exogenous and depends only on the theater’s type τi.
Let pid(xit) and pif (xit) be the single-period profits per movie screening in state xit
from screening a digital or film copy, respectively. Due to cost reductions from digital
projection, these profits satisfy: pif (xit) ≤ pid(xit). Operating profits are obtained by
aggregating profits per movie screening across all screenings, and are given by
pi(xit, ht) = R(τi)×

sit
Si
pid(xit) + (1− ht)pif (xit) if sitSi ≤ ht
htpid(xit) + (1− sitSi )pif (xit) if sitSi ≥ ht
(1.6)
where sit/Si is the share of digital screens in the theater in period t, and ht is the
share of movies released in digital.
Three points should be noted. First, equation (1.6) implies pi(xit, ht) is strictly
concave and piece-wise linear so the single-period marginal benefit from further adop-
tion is decreasing. Ideally, theaters wishes to match the share of digital screens sit/Si
to the share of digital movies released ht.
Second, network effects are indirect: For a theater, the benefit from adopting a
digital projector depends on the share of movies available in digital ht (technology-
specific software), which in turn depends on the share of digital screens in the industry
through equation (1.4).
39This assumption reduces significantly the complexity of the model. Relaxing these assumptions
would yield firm-specific shares of digital movies {hit}i∈I . Smaller theaters might be able to delay
their conversion longer because they screen fewer movies overall. Ignoring this mechanism would
affect the estimation results by predicting lower profits from adoption for smaller theaters.
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Third, a theater’s type (firm and market characteristics) impacts the theater’s
profits per screen, pi(xit, ht)/Si, via two channels: the number of screenings per screen
R(τi)/Si and the profit per screening (pid(xit), pif (xit)). The impact of theater size
on profits per screen can be non-linear if, for instance, larger theaters have more
screenings per screen (R(τi)/Si increasing in Si), but profits per screening decrease
with theater size (pid(xit), pif (xit) decreasing in Si).
State space: In a Markov Perfect Equilibrium, firms use Markov adoption strate-
gies and condition their adoption decision only on the current vector of state variables
ωit ≡ (xit, pt,yt, it). Although theater i’s single-period profits, Π(.), do not directly
depend on the industry state yt, the firm tracks this variable in order to form expec-
tations about the future evolution of st which in turn determines, via equation (1.4),
the (payoff-relevant) share of digital movies ht.
In this setting, the large number of firms (due to network effects at the industry
level) and the dimension of firms’ stateX generate a high-dimensional industry state
space. For instance, ignoring firm heterogeneity and assuming all 399 firms are four-
screen theaters (so sit ∈ {0, 1, 2, 3, 4}), the total number of possible industry states
yt is 1,071,993,300. To alleviate the computational burden, two assumptions are
imposed.
First, firms are assumed to condition their adoption decision on moments summa-
rizing the industry state vector yt, rather than all possible realizations of the vector yt.
Ifrach and Weintraub (2017) proposed an alternative approximation of MPE based
on moments of the industry space, which is the approach followed here.40 More pre-
cisely, firms are assumed to condition their adoption decisions on the un-normalized
first moment of the distribution of {sit}i∈I , that is, the total number of digital screens
in the industry st.
40Approximation methods to MPEs were initially proposed in the IO literature on dynamic games
with complete information by Weintraub, Benkard, and Van Roy (2008), and subsequently refined
in Benkard, Jeziorski, and Weintraub (2015).
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Second, the paper assumes that firms do not keep track of the whole vector of com-
petitors’ states zit, but only of competitors’ total number of digital screens denoted
zit.
In summary, firms are assumed to condition their adoption decisions on the
moment-based state ω˜it = (x˜it, pt, st, it), where the moment-based firm state x˜it is
defined by x˜it = (τi, sit, zit).
41 The analysis focuses on equilibria in pure symmetric
moment-based strategies, defined as mappings from the current moment-based state
ω˜it into actions (i.e., number of screens to be converted to digital).
Perceived transition kernel: Define γ˜it ≡ (x˜it, pt, st), as the moment-based state
excluding the private firm-specific shock, so that
ω˜it = (x˜it, pt, st, it) = (γ˜it, it)
Similarly define γit ≡ (xit, pt,yt) as the true underlying state excluding the private
firm-specific shock, so that
ωit = (xit, pt,yt, it) = (γit, it)
As noted in Ifrach and Weintraub (2017), the moment-based state process {γ˜it, t ≥ 0}
is in general not Markov, even if the true state process {γit, t ≥ 0} is. By aggregat-
ing information via moments, the moments obtained are not necessarily sufficient
statistics for next period’s moments: for instance, given st, next-period state st+1
depends on whether the st digital screen are owned by small vs. large theaters, art
vs. non art house theaters, or located in rural vs. large urban market. In this sense,
many underlying industry distributions can yield the same current-period moment
st, but different next-period moment st+1. Therefore, one has to construct a Markov
approximation of the kernel transition matrix guiding the dynamics of the process
41This definition differs from Ifrach and Weintraub’s (2017) definition of the moment-based indus-
try state in the fact that it does not keep track of dominant firms’ states, but only of an aggregate
moment describing the states of firms.
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{γ˜it, t ≥ 0}. Assume theater i follows moment-based adoption strategy a′ while all
other theaters use moment-based adoption strategy a. The objective is to define a
kernel P̂a′,a, which is a good approximation of the non-Markov process {γ˜it, t ≥ 0}.
The process described by P̂a′,a correponds to firm i’s perception of the evolution of
its own state x˜it = (τi, sit, zit), the adoption price pt, and the industry moment st.
To keep the exposition concise, the construction of the perceived transition kernel is
detailed in Appendix A.3.1.
Value function and optimal adoption rule: Let a(γ˜it, it) be a pure moment-
based adoption strategy. Firms aim to maximize expected discounted profits, by
choosing the number of screens to equip with a digital projector at the current period,
taking into account the effect on future operating profits and given their belief about
future values of the state vector. The moment-based value function of firm i is defined
as the solution of the following Bellman equation (where the subscript t is omitted
and next-period variables are marked with a prime):
V (γ˜i, i) = max
ai
{
pi(x˜i, h)− ai(p+ i)
+ β
∑
z′i,p′,s′
V (τi, si + ai, z
′
i, p
′, s′)P̂a(z′i, p
′, s′|γ˜i)
} (1.7)
where β is the discount factor, P̂a is the perceived transition kernel previously defined,
giving the perceived probability of one-period reachable states for competitors’ digital
screens, the adoption price, and the adoption moment vector s, given firm i’s belief
a about its competitors’ actions. The share of digital movies can be derived using
equation (1.4) as: h′ = Γ(s′/S). Moreover, V (τi, , si + ai, z′i, p
′, s′) is firm i’s ex-ante
value function, that is, before observing next-period firm-specific shock ′i. It is given
by: V (τi, si + ai, z
′
i, p
′, s′) =
∫
V (τi, si + ai, z
′
i, p
′, s′, ′i)dF (
′
i).
The optimal adoption rule can be expressed as a function of the choice-specific
value functions. Let W (ai|γ˜i) denote the discounted expected value function when
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firm i converts ai screens in the current period:
W (ai|γ˜i) = β
∑
z′i,p′,s′
V (τi, si + ai, z
′
i, p
′, s′)P̂a(z′i, p
′, s′|γ˜i) (1.8)
Define ∆W (k|γ˜i) ≡ W (k|γ˜i)−W (k−1|γ˜i) for k ∈ {1, 2, .., Si} as the difference in
the choice-specific value functions of converting k and k − 1 screens to digital. Firm
i’s optimal adoption rule is derived by noting that, in deciding the number of screens
to convert to digital technology, the firm compares the choice-specific value functions
net of the adoption cost. The adoption cost, in turn, depends on the current list price
pt, and firm i’s idiosyncratic shock it. The optimal adoption rule takes the form of
a set of cut-offs in it.
42 It can be expressed as
ait =

0 if ∆W (1|γ˜it)− pt ≤ it
k if ∆W (k + 1|γ˜it)− pt < it ≤ ∆W (k|γ˜it)− pt
and 1 ≤ k < Si − sit
(Si − sit) if it < ∆W (Si − sit|γ˜it)− pt
(1.9)
The optimal adoption rule can alternatively be recast in the form of conditional
choice probabilities (CCP):
P (ait|γ˜it) =

∫∞
∆W (1|γ˜it)−pt dF (it) if ait = 0
∫ ∆W (k|γ˜it)−pt
∆W (k+1|γ˜it)−pt dF (it) if ait = k ∈ {1, 2, ..., Si − sit − 1}
∫ ∆W (Si−sit|γ˜it)−pt
−∞ dF (it) if ait = Si − sit
(1.10)
42The cut-off rule can be derived by noting the following two points: (1) ait is optimal in state
γ˜it iff W (ait|γ˜it) − ait(pt + it) ≥ W (a′|γ˜it) − a′(pt + it) for all a′ 6= ait, and (2) ∆W (k|γ˜it) is
decreasing in k (W is concave - which stems from the strict concavity of the single-period profit
function pi(x˜i, h) in ai,t−1). Combining (1) and (2) yield the cut-off rule.
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Finally, the ex-ante value function (i.e., before the firm observes the idiosyncratic
shock it) can be derived by taking expectations with respect to i in equation (1.7):
V (γ˜i) = pi(x˜i, h) +
∑
ai
P (ai|γ˜i)
(− ait(p+ E[i|γ˜i, ai]) +W (ai|γ˜i)) (1.11)
The last equation expresses the ex-ante value function V , as a function of the choice-
specific value function W and probabilities P (ai|γ˜i). The latter are both functions of
the ex-ante value function. An equilibrium ex-ante value function is a fixed-point of
this mapping.
1.6.2 Market Equilibrium
In every period, the sequence of events is as follows: First, distributors observe the
outstanding number of digital screens st in the industry and publicly make their
distribution decision (film or digital) for movies released in that period. Second,
theaters receive a private draw it from the distribution of hardware costs, and decide
whether to convert any screens to digital, given the share of movies released in digital
ht, their competitors’ digital screens, and their private adoption cost. Third, theaters
receive operating profits and pay the adoption cost. The state variables evolve as
the adoption decisions are completed and new values of the exogenous variables are
realized.
The analysis focuses on equilibrium in pure symmetric moment-based strategies.
In a moment-based equilibrium, each theater’s adoption decision is optimal in every
(moment-based) state, given its beliefs about future states, and those beliefs are
consistent with the adoption decisions of other theaters. The adoption strategy a∗ is
a moment-based equilibrium if:
V (γ˜it; a
∗) ≥ V (γ˜it; a′i, a∗−i) for all firm states γ˜it and strategies a′i (1.12)
where V (γ˜it; a
∗) is theater i’s ex-ante value function at state γ˜it, given that all theaters
play strategy a∗, and V (γ˜it; a′i, a
∗) is theater i’s ex-ante value function when the
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theater unilaterally deviates to strategy a′i. Given the large number of theaters, the
mapping Γ(.) is assumed to be the same under strategy profiles a∗ and (a′i, a
∗
−i) (it is
not affected by unilateral deviations).
Due to network effects, the game has multiple equilibria, some of which can be found
numerically.43
1.6.3 Remarks
The assumption that theaters make their adoption decisions independently, even
within chains, is violated if theater chains coordinate adoption decisions across the-
aters. Two incentives to do so are: (1) to benefit from lower per-unit adoption cost
when placing large orders of projectors and (2) to tip the industry by significantly
increasing the share of digital screens in the industry. To alleviate concern (1), the
model controls for chain effects in the profits from operating (firm type τi include
an indicator for the three largest theater chains). Regarding the second motive, the
largest chain (Gaumont-PathA˜ c©) controlled 12.1% of screens and had a market share
(box-office revenue) of approximately 20%: given its relatively small capital stock of
screens, its ability to tip the market toward digital appears limited.
1.7 Estimation
This section discusses the identification and estimation of the structural model pre-
sented in section 1.6. The objective is to recover (1) the single-period profit functions
per digital and film movie screening (pid(x˜it), pif (x˜it)) and (2) the variance of the firm-
specific shock. To circumvent computational and equilibrium multiplicity issues, the
43The existence proof in Ifrach and Weintraub (2017) requires the industry state process to be
irreductible and aperiodic (and is derived for the long-run perceived kernel, not the short-run kernel
used here), so it is not directly applicable to this setting. One can, however, show that at least one
degenerate equilibrium (e.g., with no adoption) exists.
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model is estimated using a two-step CCP-based approach (Bajari, Benkard, and Levin
(2007)). Estimation results point to cost reductions from digital projection, hetero-
geneity in profits per screen across theaters, and the presence of scale economies in
operation (profits per screen increasing in theater size).
1.7.1 Identification
Standard results for the identification of discrete-choice models, as in Magnac and
Thesmar (2002) and Bajari, Chernozhukov, et al. (2015), apply to this setting. Vari-
able profits are identified, but fixed-cost components entering operating profits must
be normalized to zero. The discount factor β is assumed to be known.
Differences in adoption times (and units of technology acquired) across firms allow
the identification of the functions pid and pif ’s dependence on firm state x˜it. Because
the aggregate adoption cost, which is observed by the econometrician (up to a firm-
specific private shock), is decreasing over time, differences in adoption times across
firms reveal differences in the paid adoption costs, which translate into differences in
firms’ single-period profits: for example, firms that adopt earlier must be receiving
higher single-period profits than firms that adopt later.
More precisely, to evaluate which elements of the single-period profit functions
are identified, note that there are two motives for adopting a digital projector. A
firm adopts a digital projector: (1) to gain access to digital movies it would oth-
erwise not be able to screen and (2) for cost-reduction purposes (the profits from
screening a digital movie may be higher than the profits from screening a film movie:
(pif (x˜it) ≤ pid(x˜it))).
Adoption for the first motive is informative about pid(x˜it). When ht >
sit
Si
(i.e., the
share of digital movies released is greater than the share of digital screens owned by
theater i), theater i adopts in order to gain access to new digital movies (the fraction
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ht− sitSi of un-screened digital movies). The marginal benefit from adoption per-movie
screening is pid(x˜it). The variation in adoption times across different theaters, allows
the identification of the function pid(x˜it).
Adoption for the second motive is informative about the difference pid(x˜it)−pif (x˜it),
or the cost-reduction from screening a digital movie relative to a film movie. 44 This
difference is identified by exploiting capital indivisibilities. Consider the example in
Figure 1.7. Given ht and the fact that the theater has not adopted yet, the four-
screen theater contemplates the options of converting one screen (left panel) or two
screens (right panel). In the first case, the theater forgoes profits of A × pid(x˜it),
whereas in the second case, the theater forgoes profits of B×pif (x˜it) (where A and B
are masses of movies). Ignoring continuation values, the theater chooses to convert
two rather than one screen ( sit
Si
= 1/2) iff A × pid(x˜it) − B × pif (x˜it) ≥ pt. In cases
where this inequality holds (which correspond to cases where theaters over-invest),
different adoption times allow identification of the difference (pid(x˜it) − pif (x˜it)) (up
to the known constants A and B).
Figure 1.7: Identification of pid(x˜it)− pif (x˜it)
Finally, the variance of the firm-specific shock, V (it) = σ
2, is identified from the
44A direct way of identifying this difference would exploit the presence of multi-homed movies,
which are available on both formats, and therefore impact theaters’ incentive to adopt only via the
cost reduction motive. However, due to data limitation, this identification approach is not possible
under the “no-multihoming” assumption (hmt = 0).
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variation in adoption times and units of technology adopted between theaters in the
same firm state x˜i.
1.7.2 Estimation
1.7.2.1 Parameterization:
This section details the model parameterization. A theater’s single-period operating
profits are constructed as the product of the total number of screenings R(τi) and the
expected profit per screening. The total number of screening R(τi) and the profits per
movie screening (pif (x˜it), pid(x˜it)) are parameterized, and are estimated separately.
The number of screenings R(τi) is estimated outside the model, using data on
screenings in 2015 for each active theater in the model. This variable is explained
by a reduced-form model that includes theater and market characteristics part of
theater type τi: theater size Si, market size marketi, number of rival screens S−i, art
house status arti, and interaction between these variables. This specification allows
the number of screenings per screen to vary non-linearly with theater size, capturing
potential scale economies. The assumption that the 2015-level for the dependent
variable is representative of the diffusion period relies on the fact that the annual
number of screenings per screen did not vary significantly over the diffusion period.45
For the single-period profit per movie screenings pid(x˜it) and pif (x˜it), a simple
Breshnahan and Reiss (1991)-style reduced form is used:
pif (x˜it) = α
f
0 + α
f
1Si + α
f
21{arti = 1}+ αf3S−i + αf4zit + αfmarketi + αfchaini (1.13)
45The annual number of screenings per screen for multi/megaplexes (8 screens or more) was on
average 1, 787 with a standard deviation of 40 over 2008− 2015, whereas for miniplexes, the average
number of screenings per screen is 1, 346 with a standard deviation of 30 (based on CNC’s “bilan
2015” and the report by the Digital Diffusion Observatory published in September 2016. Both
reports are available (in French) at: http://www.cnc.fr/web/fr/publications)
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pid(x˜it) = α
d
0 +α
d
1Si+α
d
21{arti = 1}+αd3S−i+αd4zit+αdmarketi +αdchaini +αd5
sit
Si
(1.14)
where Si is the number of screens in theater i, sit is the number of digital screens in
theater i in period t, arti is an indicator for art house theaters, S−i is the total number
of screens owned by theater i’s competitors, zit is the total number of digital screens
owned by theater i’s competitors in period t, and αmarketi and αchaini are dummies
for market size and chain identifier.46
The cost reduction from screening digital movies compared to film movies is al-
lowed to depend on the share of digital screens in theater i via the term αd5
sit
Si
. The
cost reduction is expected to be increasing in theater i’s share of digital screens. This
specification is imposed because, according to industry professionals, operating both
technologies simultaneously within a given theater is relatively costly (e.g., limited
ability to re-allocate movies across screens within the theater).
The specifications for R(τi) and (pid(x˜it), pif (x˜it)) allow profits per screen to vary
non-linearly with theater size via two channels: the number of screenings per screen
and profits per screening. This specification will capture potential scale economies,
for which empirical evidence is available (Verma (2001)).47 The variables S−i and
zit entering (pid(x˜it), pif (x˜it)) capture the effect of strategic interactions between com-
petitors on profits.
The parameters of interest are the vector
α =
({αji}i=0...5, αjmarket=1...6, αjchain=0...3, j ∈ {f, d})
entering the profit per digital and film screenings and the variance σ2 of the firm-
specific shock.
46See Table 1.1 for the different categories of market size.
47Only variable profits are identified, so potential scale economies are not due to fixed costs
(concession stands, box-office etc.) but to decreasing average variable cost.
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1.7.2.2 Estimation approach:
The paper follows the two-step method of BBL (2007) for two reasons. First, the high
dimensionality of the model, due to network effects at the industry-level, renders a full-
solution method impractical. Second, as is common in games of technology adoption
under network effects, equilibrium multiplicity is severe. The two-step method, which
avoids equilibrium computation, helps circumvent the multiplicity issue by directly
estimating the equilibrium played in the data.
In a first step, the equilibrium policy rule and transition probabilites are estimated
from the data, under the assumption that firms play a moment-based equilibrium,
and then equilibrium value functions are approximated via simulation by using the
estimated equilibrium policy functions and transition probabilities. In a second step,
the parameters are estimated by imposing the optimality condition stating that the
equilibrium value function yields a higher payoff than the value function from non-
equilibrium deviations.
First-step estimation:
Movie theaters’ adoption-policy function. The first element to estimate is the equi-
librium policy function governing theaters’ adoption of digital hardware. The policy
function is a cut-off rule in the idiosyncratic shock it given by equation (1.9). The es-
timation proceeds by first recovering the conditional choice probabilities (CCP) from
the data. Next, the cut-offs forming the equilibrium policy function are obtained from
the CCP by inverting equation (1.10). The conditional choice probabilities P (ait|γ˜it)
are estimated using an ordered probit model, and in what follows are assumed to be
known.48
48In the estimation part, the network size effect (share of digitally equipped screens across the
industry) is separately identified from the adoption cost in the policy rule P (ait|γ˜it) via functional
form restriction. Additionally, to simulate the value function at states γ˜it which are not visited in
the data, knowledge of the CCP P (ait|γ˜it) is required, and the two-step estimation method relies
on the functional form of the policy function.
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The cut-offs are recovered by noting that for a ∈ {0, .., Si − sit},
P (ait ≤ a|γ˜it) =
∫ ∞
∆W (a+1|γ˜it)−pt
dF (it) = 1− Φ
(
∆W (a+ 1|γ˜it)− pt
σ
)
(1.15)
where it ∼ N(0, σ2) and Φ is the normal cumulative distribution. The cut-offs can
be obtained by inverting equation (1.15):
∆W (a+ 1|γ˜it)− pt
σ
= Φ−1(1− P (ait ≤ a|γ˜it)) (1.16)
If the firm idiosyncratic shock it equals this (normalized) cut-off, firm i is indifferent
between adopting a and a+ 1 digital screens, in state γ˜it.
Transition probabilities of the exogeneous hardware price process. To estimate the
transition probabilities of the price process {pt, t ≥ 0}, the variable is first discretized.
The number of discrete grid points is 15. Over the diffusion period, the price pro-
cess was on a downward trend, possibly due to technological advances in hardware
manufacturing, learning by doing, and scale economies. Every period, the price is
assumed to either move to a lower grid point, or stay at the current state. The initial
(and maximum) price at t = 0 is set at the actual price level observed in the data:
e84, 000. The minimum price level is set at e40, 000. The probability that the price
transitions to a lower grid point is estimated from the transitions observed in the
data.
Distributors’ policy function. As noted in the model, distributors’ policy rule regard-
ing the distribution format (film or digital) is aggregated, because the data provides
only information on the aggregate share of movies released on digital format ht.
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The relationship between the share of digital movies ht and the aggregate share of
digital screens st, given by equation (1.4), is fitted directly from the data.
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49Under the “no multi-homing” assumption, hmt = 0 for all t.
50Note the industry share of digital screens accounts for (subsidized) small theaters and theaters
that entered already equipped with digital projection. Their adoption is, however, assumed to follow
a deterministic and exogeneous process. Theaters in the model take this process as given.
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Value functions. The expected value function at a given state is forward-simulated:
a large number of paths starting at the given state are simulated using the estimated
policy rules, and the discounted sum of profits obtained from these simulated paths
are averaged. The simulated paths, starting from a given state {γ˜i0}i∈I , are generated
using the following procedure:
1. Initialize the industry at the given state {γ˜i0}i∈I .
2. Draw firm specific adoption shocks {i0}i∈I and corresponding adoption deci-
sions dictated by the estimated policy rule.
3. Calculate the single period profit Π(γ˜i0, i0) given by equation (1.5).
4. Update the current state {γ˜i0}i∈I according to the adoption decisions and tran-
sition of the exogeneous price process to next period state: {γ˜i1}i∈I .
5. Repeat steps 1-4 for T periods.
The equilibrium value function at state {γ˜i0}i∈I is obtained by averaging L = 500
simulated paths. The paths have length T = 40 periods (or 20 years). The discount
factor used is β = 0.975.51 An estimate of the equilibrium value function is obtained
as
1
L
L∑
l=1
{
T∑
t=0
βtΠh(γ˜it, it|{γ˜i0}i∈I ,α, σ)
}
(1.17)
where γ˜it = (x˜it, pt, st) and Π
h(γ˜it, it|{γ˜i0}i∈I ,α, σ) is the single period profit in
simulation h at period t, when the firm follows the equilibrium adoptions strategy a∗,
under the candidate parameters (α, σ).52
51An alternative value for the discount factor, β = 0.95, is also considered.
52The linearity of the single-profit function in (α, σ) is exploited to reduce the computational
intensity of the procedure: in the second step, the value function at a given state can be simulated
only once, instead of for every candidate parameter vector (α, σ).
50
Second-step estimation: In the second step, the underlying parameters (α, σ)
are set such that equilibrium condition (1.12) is satisfied for every firm i, state γ˜i
and non-equilibrium deviation a′i. Denote by χ = {i, γ˜i, a′i} a particular equilibrium
condition. Under parameter vector (α, σ), define
g(χ;α, σ) = V̂ (γ˜i|a∗i , a∗−i)− V̂ (γ˜i|a′i, a∗−i) (1.18)
as the difference between the simulated value function at state γ˜i, when firm i plays
the estimated policy rule a∗i and the deviation a
′
i.
53 The equilibrium condition (1.12)
is satisfied if g(χ;α, σ) ≥ 0. The objective of the second step is to find the parameter
vector (α, σ) such that this inequality holds for all possible equilibrium conditions
indexed by χ. BBL (2007) demonstrate that one can restrict estimation to a suffi-
ciently large subset that covers the space of inequalities. The estimation proceeds by
selecting Nχ = 3, 600 equilibrium conditions. Deviations from the equilibrium adop-
tion strategy are obtained by adding perturbations to the estimated cut-off points.
The selected equilibrium conditions are combined to form the objective function:
Q(α, σ) =
1
Nχ
Nχ∑
j=1
(min{g(χj;α, σ)}, 0)2 (1.19)
The estimator of the underlying parameters is the solution of
min
α,σ
Q(α, σ)
This function is not trivially minimized at the zero vector, because the adoption cost
ait × pt enters in periods when the theater converts some of its screens to digital.
Although BBL (2007) derive the asymptotic formula for the variance-covariance
matrix, implementing it remains computationally burdensome (as one needs to com-
pute the cross-partial derivate of Q with respect to (α, σ) and the first-stage pa-
rameters). Bootstrap sampling is therefore preferred to obtain standard errors. One
53In the above notation, dependence on the first-step parameters is omitted for ease of notation.
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difficulty with non-parametric bootstrap is the presence of correlation in decisions
across local markets, therefore, sampling market-histories with replacement, as is
commonly done in dynamic oligopoly games, is not a valid approach. Instead, a
parametric boostrap procedure is used.54
1.7.3 Estimation Results
1.7.3.1 First-step estimates
Theaters’ adoption-policy function. The conditional choice probabilities are estimated
using a flexible reduced form, via an ordered probit model. To further control the
size of the state space, theaters’ strategy space (the number of screens that can be
converted) is restricted to lie on a grid. More precisely, miniplexes (theaters with
4 to 7 screens) are assumed to adopt on the space sit/Si ∈ {0, 14 , 12 , 34 , 1}, whereas
multi- and megaplexes (theaters with 8 screens or more) are assumed to adopt on
the space sit/Si ∈ {0, 18 , 28 , ..., 78 , 1}. Figure 1.10 shows kernel density estimates of
the intra-firm adoption rates for miniplexes (panel (a)) and multi/megaplexes (panel
(b)), conditional on partial adoption (sit/Si > 0 and sit/Si < 1). For miniplexes,
the density has three identifiable modes. The previous assumption restricting the
strategy space to the set {0, 1
4
, 1
2
, 3
4
, 1} appears non-restrictive. For multi/megaplexes,
the density shows a mode around 0.2. The grid chosen, {0, 1
8
, 2
8
, ..., 7
8
, 1}, is sufficiently
fine given the estimated density of sit/Si.
Because theaters cannot divest and roll back the old technology, a firm cannot
transition to lower states. For instance, a four-screen theater with sit/Si = 3/4 can
only transition to sit+1/Si ∈ {3/4, 1}. In this sense, next period’s possible states de-
54(1) draw a bootstrap sample of local markets (initial industry state), (2) simulate the diffusion
process across all markets in the bootstrap sample using the (parametric) first-stage estimates, and
(3) estimate the model following the two-step procedure using the bootstrap sample. Repeat the
three steps Nb times.
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Figure 1.8: Density estimate of the intra-firm rate of adoption by firm size
(a) Miniplexes (4-7 screens) (b) Multi/Megaplexes (8 screens or more)
Notes: Both density estimates correspond to the distribution of sit/Si conditional on
sit/Si > 0 and sit/Si < 1
pend on the firm’s adoption rate in the current period. This dependence is accounted
for in constructing the likelihood (see Appendix A.4).
A theater’s share of screens converted to digital between t and t + 1, denoted
ait/Si, is explained by the share of digital movies (or equivalently the aggregate share
of digital screens in the industry, through equation (1.4)), the aggregate adoption cost,
the number of screens in the theater (and its square), the share of digital screens in
the theater in period t, whether the theater is an art house, competitors’ digital
screens in period t, and competitors’ total number of screens. A second specification
augments the model by including market dummies to control for market size. A
third specification includes both market dummies and theater-chain dummies for the
three major French theater chains (Gaumont-PathA˜ c©, CGR, and UGC). Finally, a
fourth specification also controls for interactions between theater size Si and all other
variables.
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Table 1.5 presents the estimates of the ordered probit model under the four spec-
ifications. As expected, across the four specifications, the share of digital screens
in the industry (equivalently the share of digital movies) is positively related to the
probability of adoption, whereas the adoption cost is negatively related to the prob-
ability of adoption. Larger theaters are more likely to adopt, but the marginal effect
is decreasing. Art house theaters are less likely to adopt. The share of a theater’s
screens already converted to digital is negatively related to further adoption.55
Competitors’ total number of screens and digital screens do not significantly im-
pact a theater’s likelihood of adoption. This estimate indicates that strategic inter-
actions between firms are not a major determinant of adoption.56 Theaters located
in Paris are more likely to adopt than theaters located in the small urban areas with
20, 000 to 100, 000 thousands inhabitants. Among the chain dummies, CGR theaters
are more likely to adopt than single theaters or theaters belonging to smaller chains.
The rest of the analysis uses specification (4).
To check the goodness of fit, model predictions (from specification (4)) for the
share of digital screens are compared to actual shares in the data. Tables 1.6, 1.7,
and 1.8 present the comparison for all firms, miniplexes only, and multi/megaplexes,
respectively. In each table, the aggregate share of digital screens, the share of adopters
(theaters with at least one digital screen), and the average within-theater share of
digital screens (among adopters) are shown from 2006 to 2013. Overall, given the
limitations imposed by the parametric specification of the policy function, the model
captures the main trends in the aggregate, inter-firm, and intra-firm diffusion rates, for
all firms and by firm size (miniplexes vs. multi/megaplexes). Note that the aggregate
55This finding is expected because, given a share of digital movies, theaters that are lagging behind
in terms of adoption (low sit/Si) have a greater incentive to adopt.
56The likelihood-ratio test of specification (3) and (4) against a specification without competitors’
screens and digital screens fails to reject the null that both coefficients are zero at the 5% confidence
level.
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Table 1.5: Adoption policy function
Dependent variable: Share of screens converted ait/Si
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Estimate s.e Estimate s.e Estimate s.e Estimate s.e
Industry share of d-screens 0.775 0.156 0.796 0.158 1.013 0.164 1.939 0.384
Adoption cost -1.313 0.023 -1.317 0.025 -1.382 0.025 -1.514 0.038
Own screens 0.088 0.030 0.084 0.031 0.068 0.032 0.102 0.044
Own screens sqrd -0.003 0.001 -0.003 0.001 -0.001 0.001 -0.005 0.002
Art house -0.114 0.066 -0.130 0.069 -0.156 0.069 -0.321 0.218
Competitors’ d-screens 0.001 0.009 0.000 0.009 -0.003 0.009 -0.003 0.009
Competitors screens -0.002 0.003 -0.005 0.003 -0.001 0.003 0.016 0.008
Own share of d-screens -1.422 0.113 -1.443 0.113 -1.699 0.118 -1.361 0.300
Market dummies
Urban unit - <20k inhab and rural 0.102 0.139 0.104 0.140 -0.335 0.343
Urban unit - >100k inhab 0.024 0.073 0.009 0.071 -0.965 0.243
Paris - inner suburbs -0.237 0.139 -0.064 0.140 -0.718 0.354
Paris - outer suburbs -0.133 0.114 -0.000 0.060 -0.692 0.296
Paris 0.092 0.114 0.293 0.116 -0.568 0.308
Chain dummies
Gaumont-Pathe -0.146 0.079 0.211 0.254
CGR 0.309 0.093 -1.028 0.386
UGC -0.891 0.129 -1.238 0.378
Interactions: own screens × variables X
Observations 4, 788 4, 788 4, 788 4, 788
- log Likelihood 2, 222.981 2, 220.041 2, 182.751 2, 150.577
AIC 4, 461.962 4, 466.082 4, 397.502 4, 357.154
Note: For market dummies, the omitted category is “urban unit with 20–100 thousands
inhabitants.” For the chain dummies, the omitted category is “single firm and small chains.”
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share of digital screens was constantly lower for miniplexes than for multi/megaplexes,
as reflected in the predictions as well. Additionally, the intra-firm rates’ evolution
over time is smoother in the prediction than in the data.57
Table 1.6: Predictions using the adoption policy function - All firms
Aggregate Inter-firm Intra-firm
Year Data Prediction Data Prediction Data Prediction
2006 0.003 0.000 0.021 0.001 0.127 0.161
2007 0.006 0.001 0.028 0.005 0.210 0.215
2008 0.043 0.010 0.056 0.028 0.182 0.256
2009 0.159 0.093 0.122 0.197 0.420 0.359
2010 0.236 0.270 0.431 0.498 0.459 0.470
2011 0.460 0.483 0.684 0.724 0.583 0.596
2012 0.791 0.709 0.841 0.878 0.880 0.761
2013 0.939 0.922 0.934 0.931 0.985 0.934
Note: The column labelled “Aggregate” corresponds to the share of digital
screens across all firms in the industry. The column labelled “Inter-firm” cor-
responds to the share of theaters with at least one digital screen. The column
labelled “Intra-firm” corresponds to the within-theater average share of digital
screens among theaters with at least one digital screen. The predicted rates are
obtained by averaging 500 simulation paths.
57In particular, for miniplexes, the intra-firm rate jumps to 41% as early as 2007, whereas the
model predicts a slow increase between 2006 and 2009 to reach 40%. The prediction is also smoother
in the case of multi/megaplexes, with an increase in the actual intra-firm rates from 13.5% in 2008
to 41.5% in 2009, whereas the model predicts a smoother transition.
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Table 1.7: Predictions using the adoption policy function - Miniplexes (4-7 screens)
Aggregate Inter-firm Intra-firm
Year Data Prediction Data Prediction Data Prediction
2006 0.002 0.000 0.008 0.000 0.267 0.229
2007 0.007 0.000 0.017 0.002 0.415 0.293
2008 0.007 0.003 0.017 0.007 0.415 0.338
2009 0.024 0.042 0.054 0.093 0.435 0.400
2010 0.112 0.165 0.243 0.317 0.443 0.463
2011 0.294 0.348 0.498 0.584 0.569 0.549
2012 0.653 0.597 0.745 0.798 0.857 0.702
2013 0.879 0.872 0.891 0.885 0.975 0.906
Note: The columns are defined in the same way as in Table 1.6, but the
reference group is miniplexes instead of all firms. The predicted rates are
obtained by averaging 500 simulation paths.
57
Table 1.8: Predictions using the adoption policy function - Multi/Megaplexes (8-23
screens)
Aggregate Inter-firm Intra-firm
Year Data Prediction Data Prediction Data Prediction
2006 0.003 0.000 0.037 0.001 0.087 0.156
2007 0.005 0.002 0.043 0.010 0.107 0.206
2008 0.015 0.013 0.106 0.056 0.135 0.240
2009 0.092 0.113 0.207 0.332 0.415 0.344
2010 0.307 0.320 0.670 0.707 0.466 0.475
2011 0.554 0.554 0.920 0.914 0.593 0.637
2012 0.870 0.775 0.963 0.978 0.903 0.825
2013 0.973 0.950 0.989 0.987 0.997 0.966
Note: The columns are defined in the same way as in Table 1.6, but the
reference group is multi/megaplexes instead of all firms. The predicted rates
are obtained by averaging 500 simulation paths.
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Figure 1.9: Share of movies available in digital ht as a function of share of digital
screens st/S
Distributors’ reaction function. Figure 1.9 shows distributors’ reaction function (equa-
tion (1.4)) as fitted from the data. This relation gives the share of digital movies per
period, as a function of the share of digital screens in the industry.58 One issue with
games of technology adoption under network effects is the way the network is initially
seeded with the new technology to break the ”chicken or the egg” problem. In the
case of France, the problem was resolved by the US studios’ initial commitment to
distribute movies in digital (in Figure 1.9, the intercept is non-zero).
1.7.3.2 Second-step estimates
This section presents estimation results for the total number of screenings R(τi) and
profits per movie screening (pif (x˜it), pid(x˜it)). These components are combined, as in
58Under the no-multihoming assumption, hmt equals 0 for all t.
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equation (1.6), to obtain theaters’ single-period operating profits.
First, estimates for the total number of screenings are presented in Table 1.9.
Specification (1) includes firm size Si and market size marketi (and their interaction)
as explanatory variables. Specification (2) augments the model with the art house
variable. Specification (3) also includes the number of competing screens S−i.
Table 1.9: Annual number of screenings as function of theater type
Dependent variable: number of screenings
(1) (2) (3)
Own screens 2,285∗∗∗ (102) 2,547∗∗∗ (129) 2,570∗∗∗ (130)
Paris - outer suburbs 1,206 (1,346) 2,645∗ (1,415) 2,747∗ (1,411)
Urban unit - ≤ 20k inhab and rural 469 (1,733) 960 (1,726) 1,114 (1,723)
Urban unit - ≥ 100k inhab 2,989∗∗∗ (914) 4,253∗∗∗ (983) 3,926∗∗∗ (1,089)
Paris - inner suburbs 1,855 (1,575) 2,778∗ (1,581) 2,889∗ (1,577)
Paris −1,512 (1,219) −11 (1,315) −456 (1,456)
Art house 2,986∗∗∗ (1,008) 3,002∗∗∗ (1,005)
Competitors’ screens 48 (36)
Own screens × Paris - outer suburbs 33 (158) −216 (173) −237 (173)
Own screens × urban unit - ≤ 20k inhab and rural 83 (249) −69 (250) −97 (250)
Own screens × urban unit - ≥ 100k inhab −268∗∗ (114) −501∗∗∗ (132) −450∗∗∗ (138)
Own screens × Paris - inner suburbs −5 (167) −217 (177) −236 (176)
Own screens × Paris 797∗∗∗ (156) 546∗∗∗ (172) 609∗∗∗ (179)
Own screens × art house −520∗∗∗ (154) −531∗∗∗ (154)
Own screens × competitors’ screens −8∗ (4)
Constant −5,093∗∗∗ (753) −6,691∗∗∗ (962) −6,796∗∗∗ (962)
Observations 399 399 399
R2 0.909 0.911 0.912
Adjusted R2 0.906 0.908 0.909
Residual Std. Error 2,726.2 (df = 387) 2,692.6 (df = 385) 2,683.9 (df = 383)
F Statistic 349.7∗∗∗ (df = 11; 387) 304.3∗∗∗ (df = 13; 385) 265.7 ∗∗∗ (df = 15; 383)
Note: ∗∗∗p < 0.01 ;∗∗p < 0.05; ∗p < 0.1. For market dummies, the omitted category is “urban unit with 20 to 100 thousands
inhabitants.”
As expected, the annual number of screenings per theater is increasing in theater
size, and in market size. Theaters located in Paris and other urban units with more
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than 100,000 inhabitants host more screenings. Art house theaters also host more
screenings, all else equal. The effect of the number of competing screens is not
significant. Finally, the negative intercept in all specification indicates potential non-
linearities in the effect of size: the number of screenings per screen is increasing in
the theater size.59
Next, estimates of the parameters entering the single-period profits per movie
screening and the variance of adoption costs are presented in Table 1.10. The coef-
ficients entering pif (x˜it) and pid(x˜it) are restricted to be equal α
f
i = α
d
i . Profits per
screening are decreasing in theater size and are lower for art house theaters, although
estimates are not precise. In light of the previous results regarding the total num-
ber of screenings, this finding indicates that the utilization rate (i.e., the share of
seats occupied per screening) does not vary significantly with theater size. Theater
size positively affects profits per screen mainly through its effect on the number of
screenings per screen. Fixing market size, profits are decreasing in the number of
competing screens, whereas competitors’ digital screens do not affect profits (effect
of the opposite sign of competitors’ screens).
The market dummies are not significant. These estimate indicate that market size
mainly affects the number of screenings but not profits per screening. This is the case
if the utilization rate (i.e., share of seats occupied per screening) does not vary with
market size. Next, cost reductions from digital projection are positive and significant
as indicated by the coefficient on “own-share of digital screens.” Finally, the standard
deviation of adoption costs is e2, 995, and is relatively smaller than the adoption cost,
which is between e40, 000 and e84, 000. The estimate for the standard deviation of
the adoption costs is close to the average price decrease per period, e3,308, indicating
that the dispersion in adoption times for otherwise identical firms is close to one
59For example, the annual number of screenings per screen for a monopolist non-art house theater
in an urban unit with 20,000–100,000 inhabitants is 1,012 for a 4-screen theater, 1,648 for an 8-screen
theater, and 1,860 for a 12-screen theater.
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Table 1.10: Structural parameter estimates (in 2010 euros)
Estimate s.e
Profits per movie screening: pif (x˜it)
Constant 12.274 1.885
Own screens -0.043 0.057
Art house -0.657 0.827
Competitors screens -0.015 0.053
Competitors’ d-screens 0.015 0.074
Market dummies
Urban unit - >100k inhab -0.340 0.840
Urban unit - <20k inhab and rural 0.166 1.275
Paris - inner suburbs -0.923 0.833
Paris - outer suburbs -0.629 0.865
Paris -0.779 1.098
Chain dummies
Gaumont-Pathe -0.778 0.823
CGR 3.310 2.241
UGC -2.295 0.909
Profits per digital movie screening:
own share of d-screens 2.420 1.054
Adoption cost
Firm shock: standard deviation σ 2, 995 1, 441
Note: Standard errors are calculated using Nb = 600 bootstrap sam-
ples.
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Figure 1.10: Predicted distribution of annual profits per screen (in euros) across
theaters: (a) Before the diffusion of digital cinema, (b) after the diffusion of digital
cinema
(a) (b)
period.
Profits levels implied by the structural model have the correct order of magnitude.
The distribution of annual profits per screen across theaters, predicted by the model,
is presented in Figures 1.10a (before the diffusion of digital cinema) and 1.10b (at the
end of the diffusion).
Annual profits per screen are approximately between e10, 680 and e26, 130 be-
fore diffusion, and between e14, 620 and e33, 900 after diffusion. These results are
contrasted with estimates using theater chains’ income statements, obtained for the
years 2014 to 2016 (i.e., after the diffusion period). The chains’ annual total profits
are divided by the total number of screens. Estimates range between e22, 000 and
e30, 000. Therefore, profits levels implied by the structural model are economically
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Figure 1.11: Predicted annual profits per screen as a function of firm size
(a) Before the diffusion (b) After the diffusion
Notes: Predicted profits are calculated fixing other characteristics to: monopolist, non art house
theater, not horizontally integrated.
plausible and reasonable.
Finally, combining estimates for the total number of screenings with profits per
screening, the model predicts economies of scale in operation. Figures 1.11a and 1.11b
show predicted annual profits per screen as a function of theater size and market size.
Other firm characteristics are set to: monopolist, non art house, and not horizontally
integrated. The combined effect of theater size on the number of screenings per screen
and profits per screening implies that profits per screen are increasing in theater size.
The marginal effect is decreasing. An increase from 5 to 10 screens increases profits
per screen from e15, 000 to e19, 000 (to e23, 000 in Paris), before the conversion to
digital.
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1.8 Counterfactual Simulations
This section uses the calibrated model to conduct counterfactual simulations and
examine the role of the intra-firm margin at the industry and local market levels.
First, the intra-firm margin is found to significantly contribute to industry-level dif-
fusion: both the introduction time and the overall dispersion in adoption times across
screens depend on within-theater adoption rates. Second, the relationship between
local market structure (in terms of theater size and market concentration) and tech-
nology adoption is impacted by theaters’ ability to adopt at the margin (intra-firm
margin effect), controlling for the role of other factors (economies of scale and strategic
interactions).60
1.8.1 Intra-Firm Margin and Aggregate Diffusion
The first simulation exercise decomposes the diffusion of digital projection over the
industry capital stock (screens) into an inter-firm margin (diffusion across firms)
and an intra-firm margin (diffusion within firms). Additionally, the counterfactual
simulation is used to evaluate the impact of the intra-firm margin on the introduction
time, that is, the expected time to first adoption. The analysis indicates both aspects
of aggregate diffusion—duration and introduction time—are significantly impacted
by the intra-firm margin, pointing to the importance of this margin of adoption in
understanding industry diffusion.
A firm’s equilibrium adoption behavior is decomposed into an inter-firm (or exten-
sive) margin, in which the firm decides whether to begin using the technology, and an
intra-firm (or intensive) margin, in which the firm decides what fraction of its capital
stock to convert. Whereas firms’ equilibrium behavior reflects both margins, the ex-
60This paper does not discuss social welfare. A discussion of potential welfare benefits of digital
cinema, in particular via new product offerings, is presented in section 1.3.
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tensive margin can be isolated by simulating firms’ adoption behavior restricting the
strategy space from sit ∈ {0, 1, ..., Si} to sit ∈ {0, Si}. In this counterfactual, firms
are restricted to convert their whole capital stock at once, conditional on adoption.
In this sense, the intra-firm (or intensive) margin is shut down. Because the objective
is to decompose the firm’s equilibrium adoption behavior, only a counterfactual best
response (to the equilibrium played in the data) is necessary—that is, fixing the price
process {pt, t ≥ 0} and the share of digital movies {ht, t ≥ 0} over time to their values
in the equilibrium played in the data. The best response is computed using the value
function iteration algorithm of Pakes and McGuire (1994).61
Figure 1.12 presents the diffusion curves (industry-wide share of screens equipped
with a digital projector over time) under the equilibrium adoption strategy (inter/intra-
firm), and the counterfactual adoption best response (inter-firm only). The simulation
shows that the introduction time, or expected time to first adoption, is delayed from
June 2007 to January 2011. In the counterfactual case, the diffusion is complete
by June 2013, whereas in the equilibrium case, diffusion is completed by June 2015.
These findings imply that the inter-firm margin, or dispersion in adoption times across
firms, explains 31% of the aggregate diffusion (or dispersion in adoption times across
units of capital). In other words, 69% of the dispersion in adoption across screens is
due to dispersion in adoption within firms.
The introduction lag—defined as the difference in introduction times—between
the equilibrium and counterfactual diffusion paths is 1, 297 days and corresponds to
44% of the equilibrium diffusion duration. The introduction time is significantly im-
pacted by firms’ ability to gradually convert their capital of screens to the new digital
technology. This finding is expected as firms delay their adoption until sufficiently
many movies are released in digital, because they are constrained to make a binary
61Note that, while a counterfactual equilibrium—in which the share of digital movies is endoge-
nously determined—is of separate interest, obtaining such equilibrium is complicated by equilibrium
multiplicity due to network effects.
66
Figure 1.12: Aggregate adoption rate with and without the intra-firm adoption margin
Note: The diffusion curves are obtained by generating 500
sample paths with a length of 20 years. The sample average of
these paths are reported. The 95% confidence interval is obtained
by using the structural parameters corresponding to 5th and 95th
percentiles of the distribution of time to full adoption.
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adoption decision.62 While the previous result concerns introduction times at the in-
dustry level, the next section focuses on introduction times at the local market level
(urban and rural unit).
1.8.2 Introduction Lag and Market Structure
This section analyzes the role of the intra-firm adoption margin in explaining differ-
ences in adoption times across firms. Such differences have been historically attributed
to two important factors: firm size (economies of scale) and market concentration
(strategic incentives).63 This section distinguishes the effect of the intra-firm margin
from the latter two factors, and shows that this margin accounts for an important
share of the differences in adoption times across firms.
1.8.2.1 Firm size
The adoption data indicates large theaters converted faster than small theaters to
digital projection. For example, by 2010, 24% of all miniplex theaters (4–7 screens)
had at least one digital screen, against 64% of all multi/megaplex theaters (8–23
screens).64 Fixing theater and local market characteristics, the presence of scale
economies can in part explain the delay in adoption of a small theater relative to a
large theater. If profits per digital screen increase with theater size, large theaters
will adopt earlier than small theaters. This subsection argues that, in addition to the
aforementioned factor, the intra-firm margin plays an important role in explaining this
delay: large theaters introduce the technology faster because they are able to convert
62Fixing the counterfactual share of digital movies ht and the adoption cost pt as in the data is
crucial for the introduction lag computed. If, for instance, firms expected ht to reach 1 in 2008, the
counterfactual introduction time would be earlier than 2008.
63See Hall and Khan (2002).
64See Tables 1.7 and 1.8.
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a smaller fraction of their capital stock. It is optimal to do so due to the presence
of indirect network effects: the benefit from adopting depends on the availability of
digital movies, and initially, only a small fraction of movies is released in digital.
To separate the contribution of the intra-firm margin from that of scale economies,
the introduction time—defined as the expected time to first adoption—is simulated
in a given local market (set to an urban unit with more than 100, 000 inhabitants),
with one monopolist theater owning Si screens, under (1) the equilibrium adoption
strategy (equilibrium played in the data) and (2) the counterfactual best response
with no intra-firm margin. Theater characteristics are set to non-art house, not part
of a theater chain.
Denote by TESi,m the introduction time in this local market with a monopolist
theater with size Si, under the equilibrium adoption strategy. Similarly, define T
C
Si,m
as the introduction time in the same local market with a monopolist theater with
size Si, under the counterfactual best-response strategy. As in the previous section,
the theater is best responding to the equilibrium played in the data. In particular,
the hardware price and the share of digital movies follow the same processes as in
the equilibrium played in the data. By varying the monopolist’s size Si, differences
in introduction times between small and large firms, TESi=small,m − TESi=large,m and
TCSi=small,m − TCSi=large,m, are obtained.
In the counterfactual with no intra-firm margin, differences in introduction times
across theaters with varying size (TCSi=small,m − TCSi=large,m) will reflect differences in
period profits stemming from economies of scale. In the equilibrium, these differences
in introduction times (TESi=small,m−TESi=large,m) will reflect both scale economies as well
as the intra-firm margin effect. The results are shown in Table 1.11.65 The reference
firm is a four-screen theater (small = 4), and introduction lags are computed relative
65The percentiles of TE4,m − TESi,m and TC4,m − TCSi,m are obtained by using all bootstrap estimates
(for the policy rule and the structural parameters) to simulate these introduction lags, and derive
their empirical distribution.
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to larger theaters (Si ∈ {8, 10, 12}). The introduction lag in the equilibrium case is
between 398 and 532 days, whereas the introduction lag in the counterfactual case is
between 278 and 304 days. The results indicate the intra-firm margin accounts for
30% to 42% of the introduction lag. The remainder is due to scale economies.
Table 1.11: Introduction lag (in days) by firm size
Equilibrium: TE4,m − TESi,m Counterfactual: TC4,m − TCSi,m
intra and inter-firm margins inter-firm margin
Firm size Mean 5th 95th Mean 5th 95th
Si = 8 398.3 314.2 480.4 278.3 141.9 404.8
Si = 10 468.0 383.9 557.8 294.3 146.3 416.8
Si = 12 532.9 434.9 633.4 304.8 150.4 427.5
Note: Summary statistics of the introduction lag between the reference firm
(Si = 4) and larger firms, are presented. The introduction lags are computed
by averaging 500 sample paths for each firm. The means of TE4,m and T
C
4,m
correspond to March 2011 and September 2012 respectively.
1.8.2.2 Market concentration
The previous exercise focuses on the difference in introduction times between a small
and large monopolist theater, controlling for theater and market characteristics. This
subsection performs the same decomposition exercise, varying local market concen-
tration instead of theater size. That is, the total capital stock of screens in the local
market is kept fixed, while varying the number of (equally-sized) theaters competing
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in this local market. Differences in introduction times between local markets with
different levels of market concentration will stem from scale economies (as the av-
erage theater size increases with market concentration), strategic interactions (as a
theater’s adoption decision depends on its rivals’ film and digital screens), and the
intra-firm margin effect outlined in the previous subsection. The objective is to eval-
uate the contribution of the latter to differences in introduction times between local
market with different levels of concentration.
Introduction times are computed under (1) the equilibrium adoption strategy
(equilibrium played in the data) and (2) the counterfactual best response with no
intra-firm margin. Theater characteristics are set to non-art house, not part of a
theater chain. The total stock of screens is set to 24 screens. The market size is set
to “urban unit with more than 100,000 inhabitants.”
Denote by TEn,m the introduction time in this local market with n equally sized
theaters, under the equilibrium adoption strategy (equilibrium played in the data).
Similarly, define TCn,m as the introduction time in this local market with n equally sized
theaters, under the counterfactual best-response strategy, with no intra-firm margin.
By varying the number of theaters in the market, n, differences in introduction times
between markets with different level of concentration are obtained: TEn1,m−TEn2,m and
TCn1,m − TCn2,m, with n1 > n2.
The number of competitors in the market, n, takes values in {1, 2, 3, 6}. The
reference market is the less concentrated market with six four-screen theaters (n1 = 6),
and is compared to more concentrated markets: monopoly, duopoly, and three-firm
oligopoly (n2 ∈ {1, 2, 3}). The introduction time is simulated for all markets, and
differences (or introduction lags) are shown in Table 1.12.66 The introduction lag
under the equilibrium adoption strategy is between 205 and 256 days, whereas the
introduction lag under the counterfactual is between 78 and 116 days. These results
66The percentiles are obtained as in Table 1.11.
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indicate that the intra-firm margin accounts for 43% to 69% of the introduction
lag between the reference market (n1 = 6) and more concentrated markets (n2 ∈
{1, 2, 3}). The rest of the lag is explained by economies of scale (as average theater
size decreases with n) and strategic interactions between theaters.
Table 1.12: Introduction lag (in days) by number of firms
Equilibrium: TE6,m − TEn2,m Counterfactual: TC6,m − TCn2,m
intra and inter-firm margins inter-firm margin
Market Mean 5th 95th Mean 5th 95th
n2 = 3 205.5 136.6 269.5 116.7 64.5 184.2
n2 = 2 210.7 106.7 298.1 113.1 50.3 189.7
n2 = 1 256.2 -14.7 528.2 78.5 5.0 160.8
Note: Summary statistics of the introduction lag between the reference market
(n1 = 6) and more concentrated markets, are presented. The introduction lags
are computed by averaging 500 sample paths for each market. The means of
TE6,m and T
C
6,m correspond to August 2009 and February 2012 respectively.
1.9 Conclusion
This paper investigates the role of network effects in intra-firm technology adoption.
The within-firm share of capital equipped with the new technology increases with
the availability of complementary software. In turn, software availability increases as
the hardware technology diffuses across and within firms. The study focused on the
digitalization of the movie distribution and exhibition industries because they offer
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an ideal setting for studying this mechanism.
The analysis shows that when software availability matters for adoption, the intra-
firm margin explains a significant share of the aggregate diffusion phenomenon: in
terms of dispersion in equilibrium adoption times, as well as time to first adoption.
Second, because firms with varying size differ in their ability to gradually roll out the
technology, intra-firm adoption dynamics and the presence of capital indivisibilities
amplify the positive relationship between firm size and early adoption; i.e., they
explain a significant share of the delay in adoption of smaller firms.
Two implications can be derived. First, the results underline the fact that design-
ing policies (e.g., technology subsidies) that encourage faster technological diffusion
within firm may be as important as designing policies that encourage faster diffusion
across firms. Second, in a network industry or hardware-software system, new tech-
nologies are adopted earlier if individual firms are larger, because they are able to
adopt at the margin. This sheds new light on potential effects of antitrust and merger
control on firms’ ability to adopt innovations.
The current study could be extended in several directions, one important is noted.
An avenue of research would be to analyze the role of vertical relations between the
software and hardware industries (here, distribution and exhibition) and the effect
of such vertical relations on firms’ incentives to adopt. These vertical relations are
particularly relevant if the payoff from adopting is asymmetric between the software
and hardware markets and involves transaction costs.
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CHAPTER 2
A Study of Umbrella Damages from Bid-Rigging
2.1 Introduction
When a cartel does not include every firm competing in an industry, non-cartel firms
can set their own prices higher than they would otherwise have been able to under
competitive conditions. This is in particular the case in markets where contracts are
awarded via first-price procurement auctions. When the results of such procurement
procedures (bids and bidders identities) are not concealed from non-cartel firms, they
may serve as an indication of the prevailing price level when future contracts are
procured for. Consequently, non-cartel bidders benefit from the protection of the
cartel’s inflated bidding, and operate “under the cartel’s umbrella.” Purchasers from
non-cartel bidders will still pay a price that exceeds what the market price would
be in the absence of collusion. In this sense, damages inflicted by non-cartel bidders
broaden the scope of cartel damages. Nonetheless, empirical research investigating
the importance of such damages remains scarce. This paper conducts a detailed study
of umbrella damages by examining the bidding behavior of non-cartel bidders facing
the Texas school milk cartel between 1980 and 1992.
Bid-rigging was a pervasive phenomenon in auctions for the supply of milk to
schools, at least until the early 1990s. According to Porter and Zona (1999), inves-
tigations were conducted in more than twenty states across the US, more than $90
millions of fines were levied, while about 90 people were sent to jail for sentences last-
ing 6 months on average. The Texas milk cartel is well-suited for analyzing damages
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inflicted by non-cartel bidders. First, two essential conditions are met: the cartel was
not all-inclusive and the auction format was first-price sealed bid.1 In particular, bids
and bidder identities are publicly announced. This public information enables non-
cartel firms to learn and adjust their bids to the supra-competitive levels sustained
by the cartel. Second, all firms involved in the cartel were convicted, which allows
to isolate non-cartel bidders and focus on their bidding behavior. Third, the dataset
collected by the Antitrust Divison of the Department of Justice spans markets with
and without cartel operations, which enables to identify the effect of the cartel’s price
umbrella on non-cartel bidders. Finally, the dataset is rich enough to allow an assess-
ment of damages inflicted by the cartel per se, as well as damages inflicted through
non-cartel bidders.
Reduced form analysis of the bid data reveals that, controlling for auction and
bidder observed heterogeneity, the largest non-cartel firm bid significantly higher
when facing the cartel. Further investigation of cartel and umbrella damages and
inefficiencies requires estimation of a structural model. Damages to the auctioneer are
decomposed into (1) cartel damages, defined as damages in auctions won by the cartel
and (2a) outsider damages, defined as damages in auctions won by the non-cartel firm,
when it is the lowest cost bidder and (2b) misallocation damages, defined as damages
in auctions won by the non-cartel firm, when the cartel bidder is the lowest cost bidder.
Case (2b) arises because partial collusion introduces asymmetry among bidders in the
first-price procurement setting: the cartel bidder has a stronger incentive to inflate his
bid above his cost than the non-cartel bidder. As a result, the winner is not necessarily
the lowest cost bidder, and the auction is no longer efficient. (2a) and (2b) form what
is defined as umbrella damages. Because the cartel’s internal structure is unknown,
1In ascending or second price auctions, bidding one’s private valuation is a dominant strategy
irrespective of the existence of the cartel, therefore umbrella damages do not arise. Note for umbrella
damages to arise in first-price procurement auction, one need not assume that non-cartel firms know
the existence of the cartel per se, but only that they know the equilibrium bid distribution of their
lowest bidding opponent, which can be inferred from past auctions.
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bounds on outsider and misallocation damages are derived assuming two extreme
cases for the cartel mechanism: either the mechanism is efficient (i.e., the lowest
cost cartel member is the cartel bidder in the target auction), or the mechanism is
inefficient (i.e., the cartel bidder is selected randomly among cartel members).2
The structural analysis shows that per contract, outsider damages (conditional on
the non-cartel firm winning) are at least 47% of cartel damages (conditional on the
cartel winning). This lower bound is obtained with an efficient cartel. If the cartel
is inefficient, outsider damages can be as large as cartel damages. Misallocation
damages are estimated to be as large as 64% when the cartel is efficient, and the
auction is asymmetric.3 With respect to inefficiencies due to the asymmetry across
bidders, losses are estimated to be 3.7% or $2, 909 per contract. The structural
estimates show that conditional on the non-cartel firm winning, prices are inflated by
2.9% to 8.5% relative to the competitive winning bid. These bounds are consistent
with the reduced form estimates of a 6% overcharge. These results points to a cartel
mechanism that was not fully efficient, but far from inefficient.4
From a competition law perspective, the complexity of proving umbrella claims
has been one of the argument stifling the recognition by US and European civil courts
of the ability of the purchasers from non-cartel firms to pursue treble damages from
colluders. This paper sheds new light on this debate by providing a case study of
umbrella damages, emphasizing the type of data and methodology that render the
estimation of damages possible and far from speculative. The US and European
2While the definition of an efficient cartel mechanism is straightforward, it is less obvious for an
inefficient cartel mechanism. In the inefficient case, the cartel bidder could be selected randomly as
is assumed in this paper. But one could think of other inefficient mechanisms such as the one in
which the cartel bidder is the least cost efficient member.
3If the cartel is inefficient, there is no asymmetry between bidders under the maintained assump-
tions and therefore no efficiency losses.
4This is consistent with Pesendorfer (2000) which shows that although the cartel didn’t use
sidepayments, it managed to retain quasi-efficient collusive rents through market division.
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competition laws have recently taken divergent paths in their treatment of whether
the civil liability in damages of the cartel members extend to umbrella damages. On
June 5th 2014, the ECJ handed down the awaited judgement in the elevator cartel
case (Kone AG and Others v. O¨BB-Infrastruktur AG), stating the right of plaintiffs
to compensation for umbrella damages.5 In its press release No 79/14, the ECJ states:
[...] where it has been established that the cartel is, in the circumstances of
the case and, in particular, the specific aspects of the relevant market, liable to
result in prices being raised by competitors not a party to the cartel, the victims
of this price increase must be able to claim compensation for loss sustained from
the members of the cartel.
At the same time, the ECJ emphasizes the ”high hurdles in terms of the burden
of proof that await” any umbrella claimants.6
In the US, competition law is inconsistent in its standing vis-a-vis umbrella claims.
The ability of purchasers from non-cartel firms to recover treble damages from the
conspirators under section 4 of the Clayton Act is uncertain because of the Supreme
Court decision in Illinois Brick Co. v. Illinois.7 In the former case, the Court
ruled that indirect purchasers (downstream buyers) may not sue on a theory that a
price-fixing overcharge has been passed on to them by intermediate sellers purchasing
from upstream colluders. Although Illinois Brick did not deal with the standing of
purchasers from nonconspiring competitors of the antitrust violator, that case was
5The elevator cartel, which involved the conclusion of anticompetitive agreements between major
European manufacturers of elevators and escalators, more specifically, Kone, Otis, Schindler and
ThyssenKrupp, operated in several Member States of the European Union over a period of many
years. The European Commission uncovered that cartel in 2003 and, in 2007, imposed fines for the
elevator cartel’s practices in the Belgian, German, Netherlands and Luxembourg markets.
6Opinion of the Advocate General Kokott.
7Section 4 of the Clayton Act provides that ”any person ... injured in his business or property”
by an antitrust violation may bring an action for treble damages.
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relied on heavily by the Third Circuit to deny standing to purchasers from non-
cartel firms.8. Again, one of the policy reasons underlying the Illinois Brick doctrine
revolves around the complexity of tracing out the causal link between the antitrust
violation and non-cartel firms’ response.9 This paper shows that in the particular
case of bid-rigging of procurement auctions, bid data can be leveraged to estimate
the size of damages when buyers do not contract directly with colluders.
This paper also relates to the debate around auction format choice. A commonly
advanced argument in favor of sealed bid auctions is that open auctions are more prone
to collusion because conspirators can immediately punish any deviations.10 This
reasoning does not account for the fact that given (partial) collusion, the auctioneer
will suffer damages of a greater scope in sealed bid auctions. As non-cartel firms adjust
their bidding strategy to the cartel, damages to the auctioneer extend to contract won
by non-conspiring firms. While in ascending auctions, the auctioneer suffers damages
only when the cartel is able to suppress the second highest bid (the auctioneer may
benefit in some cases from the cartel’s overbidding as found by Asker (2010)). This
work shows that damages in procurement auctions won by non-conspiring firm can
potentially form a non-negligible fraction of overall cartel damages. The potential
merit of sealed bid relative to open auctions is therefore nuanced with regard to these
findings.
8Judgments finding in favour of liability: United States Court of Appeals (Seventh Circuit),
United States Gypsum Co. v. Indiana Gas Co., 350 F.3d 623, 627 (2003); United States Court of
Appeals (Fifth Circuit), In re Beef Industry Antitrust Litigation, 600 F.2d 1148, 1166 (1979), State
of Washington v. American Pipe Construction Co., 280 F. Supp. 802 (D. Haw. 1968), Pollock
v. Citrus Associates, Inc. 512 F. Supp. 711 (S.D.N.Y. 1981). Judgements finding against such
liability, on the other hand, include: United States Court of Appeals (Third Circuit), Mid-West
Paper Products Co. v. Continental Group Inc., 596 F.2d 573, 597 (1979); United States District
Court (District of Columbia), Federal Trade Commission v.Mylan Laboratories, 62 F.Supp.2d 25,
39 (1999).
9Many states, including California, have enacted Illinois Brick-repealer legislation providing in-
direct purchasers standing to sue for antitrust violations.
10See the discussion in Athey, Levin, and Seira (2011) for timber auctions.
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The US milk cartels were the subject of various papers in the empirical literature
on bid-rigging. Pesendorfer (2000) examines the Florida and Texas school milk car-
tels, and shows that the data (in particular market shares and incumbency rates) is
consistent with a strong cartel in Florida (in the sense that sidepayments were used
between cartel members) and a weak cartel in Texas (no sidepayments). This paper
differs from the former in two dimensions: first, Pesendorder focuses on the Dallas-
Fort Worth (DFW) area while the dataset used in this paper includes in addition the
Waco and San Antonio areas in which the cartel was not operating, providing a set
of competitive auctions which are useful to predict counterfactuals; second, this pa-
per focuses primarily on outsiders’ response to the cartel’s bidding behavior. Hewitt,
McClave, and Sibley (1996) demonstrate that the high incumbency rates in Texas
(the supplier of a given school district doesn’t change from year to year in many
cases) can only be explained by collusion. Lee (1999) finds evidence of complemen-
tary bidding and high incumbency premia in the DFW school milk market. Porter
and Zona (1999) test for the presence of collusion in the Ohio school milk market by
comparing defendants firms in Cincinnati to a control group of non-defendants and
compute estimate of cartel damages. Lanzillotti (1996) provides a review of US milk
cartel cases, and shows that several features of the bids in Kentucky are indicative of
collusive behavior.
This paper is more broadly related to the empirical literature on bidding rings. A
first strand in this literature aims at providing econometric tests of collusion: Bald-
win, Marshall, and Richard (1997) for timber auctions, Porter and Zona (1993) for
highway construction, Bajari and Ye (2003) for contracts in the seal coat industry,
Athey, Levin, and Seira (2011) for timber auctions. A second strand in the liter-
ature focuses on the internal organization of bidding rings. Asker (2010) studies
equilibrium bidding and sidepayments in knock-out auctions held privately by the
New York stamp cartel before the actual auction. Kwoka Jr (1997) analyzes bids and
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sidepayments in knock-out auctions held by a real estate ring. Finally, a more recent
strand of the literature, closer to this paper, studies the interaction of partial cartels
and non-cartel bidders. Harrington, Hu¨schelrath, and Laitenberger (2016) analyzes
how the German cement cartel controlled the expansion of non-cartel supply (from
Eastern European countries) by sharing the collusive rents with German importers.
The empirical section of the paper relies on results from the literature on the
structural estimation of auctions. In particular, the non-parametric estimation of the
bidders’ underlying cost distribution follows the methodology introduced in Guerre,
Perrigne, and Vuong (2000). Observed auction heterogeneity is also controlled for by
using the first-stage regression technique developed in Haile, Hong, and Shum (2006).
Finally, the empirical section makes use of some of the numerical methods developed
in the computational literature on asymmetric auctions. Recent contributions in this
literature are: Li and Riley (2007), Gayle and Richard (2008), and Fibich and Gavish
(2011).
The next section describes the theoretical model of first-price procurement auc-
tions with asymmetric bidders and analyzes the effect of collusion, cartel size, and
cartel mechanism on the non-cartel firm profits and bidding behavior. Section 2
presents the school milk market and the relevant factors affecting the cost structure.
Section 3 describes the dataset. Section 4 examines the largest non-cartel firm’s bid-
ding behavior through a reduced-form approach, and shows that all else equal, the
largest non-cartel bidder overbids in school district where the cartel is operating. An
assessment of cartel and umbrella damages is presented in section 5 using a structural
approach.
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2.2 A Theoretical Model
This sections investigates properties of a non-cartel firm’s bidding behavior when
facing a cartel bidder.11 The section builds on the theoretical literature on asymmetric
first price auctions. In particular, Maskin and Riley (2000) and Lebrun (1999, 2006)
derive existence and uniqueness results, as well as comparative statics results for the
equilibrium bid functions.12 This section is also related to the theoretical literature
on bidding rings in first-price auctions: McAfee and McMillan (1992) characterize
the optimal mechanism for strong and weak cartels, while Marshall and Marx (2007)
compares first and second price auction formats when a cartel is not all-inclusive and
may or may not be able to control the bids of its members.
The questions of interest are: when does non-cartel firms benefit from their com-
petitors colluding ? How are non-cartel firm’s bidding and profits affected by the
cartel size and the cartel mechanism (relative to a situation with no cartel)?
The case of a single non-cartel firm is considered for simplicity, and in anticipation
of the empirical part. Risk-neutral firms are bidding for a single contract in a first-
price procurement setting. There is no reserve price. Denote by 1 the cartel bidder,
and by 2 the non-cartel bidder.13 For i ∈ {1, 2}, firm i’s cost ci is drawn from a
distribution Fi with support [c, c]. Fi has a continuous density fi strictly positive on
(c, c]. Cost are drawn independently across bidders, and are private. Existence and
uniqueness of an equilibrium in strictly increasing strategies was proved by Maskin
and Riley (2000) and Lebrun (1996,1999,2006) among others.
11The cartel bidder is defined as the cartel member selected to bid in the auction on behalf of the
cartel.
12Other references include Vickrey (1961), Griesmer and Levitan (1967) who study asymmetric
uniform distributions, Plum (1992) who study a class of power distributions and more recently:
Bajari (2001) and Cheng (2006). Athey (2001) derives more general existence results.
13Note that this setting does not rule out the possibility that other cartel members submit ”non-
serious” or ”complementary” bids. If that is the case, the non-cartel firm knows that it is facing
only one ”serious” bid from the cartel.
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Denote by βi bidder i’s equilibrium bidding strategy, and by φi = β
−1
i the corre-
sponding inverse bid function. Note that if bidder j bids according to φj and bidder
i submits a bid b, then the latter wins if and only if cj > φj(b). Thus, bidder i’s
expected profit from bidding b is given by:
pi(b; ci) = (b− ci) Pr(cj > φj(b)) = (b− ci) (1− Fj(φj(b))) (2.1)
The first-order condition with respect to b (at ci = φi(b)) is :
fj((φj(b))
1− Fj((φj(b))φ
′
j(b) =
1
b− ci with boundary condition φi(c) = c. (2.2)
Combining optimality conditions for the two bidders, the equilibrium bid functions
solve the following system of differential equations:

1
b−φ1(b) =
f2(φ2(b))
1−F2(φ2(b))φ
′
2(b)
1
b−φ2(b) =
f1(φ1(b))
1−F1(φ1(b))φ
′
1(b)
(2.3)
with right-boundary conditions : φ1(c) = φ2(c) = c. Maskin and Riley (2000) show
that inverse bid functions must satisfy the additional condition that the minimum bid
of all bidders is the same: φ1(b) = φ2(b) = c for some unknown b. Although analytical
solutions of problem (2.3) are in general not available, one can derive properties on
the equilibrium bid functions.
The first property, proved by Maskin and Riley (2000) and Pesendorfer (2000),
can be used to compare the cartel and non-cartel firms bid functions. Assume that
the bidders’ cost distributions can be ordered according to hazard rate dominance,
i.e
f1(c)
1− F1(c) >
f2(c)
1− F2(c) for all c (2.4)
This implies that, conditional on having a cost above c, the cartel bidder is more
likely to have a low cost than the non-cartel bidder.
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Proposition 1. Under the hazard rate dominance assumption:
1. The cartel firm bids higher than the non-cartel firm: β1(c) > β2(c) for all c ∈
(c, c)
2. Denoting by Gi bidder i’s equilibrium bid distribution (and gi the corresponding
density function), the cartel firm’s bid distribution dominates the non-cartel
firms bid distribution (in the hazard rate sense): g1(b)
1−G1(b) >
g2(b)
1−G2(b)
Proof. See Propositions 3.3 and 3.5 in Maskin and Riley (2000) or Krishna (2006).
Part 1 of the proposition implies that the non-cartel firm may win despite not
having the lowest cost among the bidders. This result in an inefficient allocation.
Part 2 of the proposition implies in particular that the non-cartel firm’s equilibrium
bid distribution first-order stochastically dominates the cartel firm’s equilibrium bid
distribution. As noted by Pesendorfer (2000), the hazard rate dominance condition
will be satisfied for instance when all firms (cartel and non-cartel firms) are ex-ante
symmetric and the cartel mechanism is efficient, i.e when the cartel bidder has the
lowest cost among cartel members. In this case, F1(c) = 1− (1− F (c))n where F is
the ex-ante symmetric distribution of bidders, and n is the number of cartel members.
One can see that f1(c)
1−F1(c) =
nf(c)
1−F (c) >
f(c)
1−F (c) =
f2(c)
1−F2(c) .
Studying the magnitude and determinants of umbrella damages requires the com-
parison of competitive equilibrium bid functions, i.e bid functions when the firms do
not collude, with the collusive bid functions derived above. Denote by n the number
of cartel members, or cartel size. For simplicity, assume that all bidders, whether or
not in the cartel, are ex− ante symmetric, and that there is a single non-cartel firm.
All firms draw their cost from a distribution F with support [c, c]. F has a continuous
density f strictly positive on (c, c]. Under these assumptions, the competitive auction
in which firms do not collude is a symmetric auction with n + 1 bidders. There is a
unique equilibrium in strictly increasing strategies (see Krishna (2006)).
83
Assumption 1 (Ex-ante Symmetric IPV). Across bidders, costs are symmetric (iden-
tically distributed according to the distribution F ), independent, and private.
Denote by β the symmetric equilibrium bidding strategy, and by φ = β−1 the
corresponding equilibrium inverse bid function. In this case, if a bidder’s cost is ci,
bidding b yields expected profits given by:
pi(b; ci) = (b− ci) Pr(cj > φ(b),∀j 6= i) = (b− ci) (1− F (φ(b)))n (2.5)
The first-order condition with respect to b (at ci = φ(b)) is :
nf(φ(b))
1− F (φ(b))φ
′(b) =
1
b− ci with boundary condition φ(c) = c. (2.6)
Let G(b) = F (φ(b)) denote the distribution of a firm’s equilibrium bid. Let
g(b) denote the corresponding density function. Since bidders are symmetric, this
distribution doesn’t depend on i. The first-order condition can be rewritten:
ci = b− 1−G(b)
ng(b)
(2.7)
Equation (2.7) expresses the individual private cost ci as a function of the indi-
vidual equilibrium bid b, and the distribution of equilibrium bid G. This mapping is
at the core of the structural estimation of the cost distribution F from the observed
distribution of bids G (see Guerre, Perrigne, and Vuong (2000) and step 2 in section
2.6.2).
2.2.1 Effect of collusion on the non-cartel firm’s profits
This subsection examines the effect of collusion between a strict subset of bidders on
the bidding and profits of the non-colluding bidder—or, outsider. First, the outsider’s
interim payoff (i.e., the expected profits conditional on his cost) always increases when
his competitors form a cartel.
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Define the outsider’s equilibrium interim payoff when facing n competitors (no
collusion):
pi(c) = max
b
(b− c) [1− F (φ(b))]n
Similarly, define the outsider equilibrium interim payoff when facing the cartel bidder
(the n competitors collude):
pi(c) = max
b
(b− c) [1− F1(φ1(b))]
Assume first that the cartel mechanism is efficient, i.e F1(c) = 1 − (1 − F (c))n.
Then we have the following lemma:
Lemma 1. If the cartel mechanism is efficient, the outsider’s interim payoff is strictly
larger when his competitors collude:
pi(c) > pi(c) for all c ∈ [c, c)
Proof. Note that if φ solve the symmetric n + 1 bidders procurement auction, it
also solves the two bidder procurement auction in which bidders’ cost are drawn
from 1 − (1 − F (c))n. When the n firms collude efficiently, we obtain a 2 bidders
asymmetric auction in which bidders’ costs are drawn from F for the non-cartel firm
and 1− (1−F (c))n for the cartel bidder. Since F and 1− (1−F (c))n can be ordered
stochastically in the hazard rate sense, Corollary 1 of Lebrun (1998) applies to obtain
the strict inequality for the non-cartel firm profits.
In general, the cartel mechanism might not be efficient. Assume that the cartel
bidder’s cost distribution F1 (given a mechanism) satisfies the conditional stochastic
dominance relation14
d
dc
(
1− F1(c)
(1− F (c))n
)
> 0 for all c ∈ (c, c] (2.8)
14Note that this relation can also be rewritten in terms of hazard rate dominance.
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Proposition 2. If (2.8) holds, the outsider’s interim payoff is strictly larger when
his competitors collude:
pi(c) > pi(c) for all c ∈ [c, c)
Proof. F1 and 1− (1− F (c))n satisfy the assumption of conditional stochastic dom-
inance, therefore Corollary 1 in Lebrun (1998) implies that the outsider’s interim
payoff is strictly larger when facing the cartel with the mechanism yielding F1 than
when facing an efficient cartel. Combining this observation with the previous lemma
gives the result.
2.2.2 Effect of the cartel size and cartel mechanism on the non-cartel
firm’s bidding
In this subsection, comparative statics for the non-cartel firm equilibrium bid func-
tion are presented. In particular, two features are investigated: the cartel size and
the cartel mechanism. Comparative statics in first-price asymmetric auctions have
been studied by Lebrun (1998). The results presented here are an application of the
main theorem proved in the latter paper to the specific case of a cartel bidding in a
procurement auction.
First, let the cartel mechanism be fixed. Using the same notations introduced
above, denote by 1 the cartel bidder, and by 2 the non-cartel bidder (Fi, for i ∈ {1, 2}
the corresponding cost distributions, which satisfy the assumptions of the model).
The dependency of the cartel bidder’s cost distribution on the cartel size n is explicitly
represented as: F1(.|n). In particular under Assumption 1, if the cartel is efficient:
F1(c|n) = 1− (1− F (c))n (minimum cost among n symmetric bidders). If the cartel
is inefficient: F1(c|n) = F (c) (cartel bidder selected randomly).
Assume the cartel mechanism is such that F1(.|n) satisfies the following conditional
stochastic dominance conditionnote1
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ddc
(
1− F1(c|n)
1− F1(c|n+ 1)
)
> 0 for all c ∈ (c, c] (2.9)
Proposition 3. Assume that (2.9) holds. Let the bid functions and their inverses
at the unique equilibrium when the cartel size is n be denoted β1(.|n),β2(.|n) and
φ1(.|n),φ2(.|n) respectively. Then
1. As the cartel size increases, the non-cartel firm bids more aggressively:
β2(c|n) > β2(c|n+ 1) for all c ∈ [c, c)
2. The larger cartel’s bid distribution is stochastically dominated by the smaller
cartel’s bid distribution:
F1(φ1(b|n)|n) < F1(φ1(b|n+ 1)|n+ 1) for all c ∈ [b, c)
where b = β1(c|n) = β2(c|n)
3. As the cartel size increases, both the cartel and non-cartel bidders’ interim profits
(conditional on their private cost) decrease
Proof. Follows directly from Theorem 1 and Corollary 1 in Lebrun (1998).
Condition 2.9 holds when the cartel mechanism is efficient. However, the condition
doesn’t hold if the cartel mechanism is inefficient (F1 is independent of n).
Next, let the cartel size be fixed. The effect of the cartel mechanism on the non-
cartel firm bidding can be analyzed. Consider two mechanisms implying a cartel
bidder’s cost distribution of either F1 or F˜1. Assume the two distribution satisfy the
conditional stochastic dominance relationnote1
d
dc
(
1− F1(c)
1− F˜1(c)
)
> 0 for all c ∈ (c, c] (2.10)
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This condition implies in particular that F˜1 is first order stochastically dominated
by F1. For instance, if F1(c) = F (c) (inefficient cartel) and F˜1(c) = 1 − (1 − F (c))n
(efficient cartel), the condition holds.
Proposition 4. Assume (2.10) holds. Let the bid functions and their inverses at the
unique equilibrium when the cartel bidder’s distribution is F1 (resp. F˜1) be denoted
(β1,β2) (resp. (β˜1,β˜2)) and (φ1,φ2) (resp. (φ˜1,φ˜2)). Then
1. The non-cartel firm bids more aggressively when the cartel bidder’s cost distri-
bution is F˜1 than when it is F1:
β2(c) > β˜2(c) for all c ∈ [c, c)
2. The cartel’s equilibrium bid distribution can be ordered according to first-order
stochastic dominance:
F1(φ(b)) < F˜1(φ˜1(b)) for all c ∈ [b, c)
where b = β1(c) = β2(c)
3. Cartel and non-cartel bidders’ interim profits (conditional on their private cost)
are lower under F˜1 than under F1.
Proof. Follows directly from Theorem 1 and Corollary 1 in Lebrun (1998).
The intuition for Proposition 3 and 4 is as follow. In both cases, as the cartel bidder
is made stronger (either by increasing the size of the cartel or by making the cartel
mechanism more efficient), the non-cartel firm responds by bidding more aggressively
(part (1) of the propositions). As a consequence, the cartel bidder’s interim payoff
decreases. In equilibrium, the cartel best response is such that it is more likely to bid
lower: the new equilibrium bid distribution is first-order stochastically dominated by
its initial equilibrium bid distribution (part (2) of the propositions). This results in
the non-cartel firm interim payoff being lower as well.
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2.3 The School Milk Market
Most public school districts in Texas use procurement auctions to allocate contracts
for the supply of school milk. Every year, between May and August, each district sets
a first-price sealed bid procurement auction, specifying contract characteristics such as
the estimated quantities (in half pint) of milk to supply by milk categories, the number
of delivery points, the contract period, the delivery times, and whether a cooler has
to be provided.15 Firms have one month to prepare their bid, which is a price per half
pint for each category of milk. A bid can be escalated or fixed. Escalated bids are
indexed to the price of raw milk, to insure the milk supplier against potentially large
fluctuations of the price of raw milk over the contract period. Bidders have to sign a
non-collusive affidavit, stating that they did not partake in any communication with
other bidders regarding prices or participation, and that they will not give or receive
any sidepayments. On the day of the letting, all submitted bids are opened and the
bidders identities and bids are publicly announced. Dairy distributors have to deliver
the packaged milk to various customers (e.g., retail stores, government agencies, and
schools). Retail stores are the main revenue source for distributors. School milk
contracts typically form 10% to 20% of a distributors’ revenue.
By nature, the school milk market is remarkably exposed to collusion. Firms
compete only on prices as the contracts terms (quantity and quality) are fixed and the
product homogenous. There are many small contracts to be gained facilitating market
division. Bids and bidder identities are publicly announced which helps detecting
price cuts by cartel members and increase transparency of prices. Firms frequently
interact as auctions are not held on the same day, which permits retaliation in case
of cheating. The demand for milk is inelastic so prices increases will yield higher
profits and are unlikely to face any buyer resistance. Finally, the market is relatively
15The main categories of milk being: whole white, whole chocolate, low-fat white, low-fat
chocolate.
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concentrated helping coordination.
Some of the aforementioned market features also enables potentially large umbrella
damages. Indeed, these damages stem from non-cartel firms adjusting their bidding
behavior to the supra-competitive levels sustained by the cartel. This is feasible since
all bids and bidder identities are publicly announced, which results in non-cartel firms
learning the price level in the rigged districts and adjusting to it. The latter channel is
reinforced by the high frequency of interactions, due to the large number of contracts
every year.
Next, the cost structure of milk processors is described. In anticipation of the
structural analysis, it is useful to decompose a milk processor’s cost when bidding for
a specific contract. This cost can be decomposed into:
1. A component common to all firms bidding for a contract: this component may
depend on observed auction characteristics such as the quantity of milk to sup-
ply, whether bids can be escalated, whether coolers and straws have to be
provided, the number of school within the district (which affects the quantity
to supply and the number of delivery points), as well as the number of deliveries
per week.
Additionally, this cost component depends on the price of raw milk, which is
regulated by federal order, as well as processing, packaging and labor costs
which, according to industry experts, are constant across firms in the market.16
2. An idiosyncratic component specific to the milk processor: this cost first de-
pends on the distance between the milk processing plant and the school district.
More precisely, it depends on how close the school district is to the firm’s dis-
16A federal milk order sets a uniform minimum price for raw milk in the area. This price is
typically increasing in the distance from the Midwest. In this paper, the marketing area was known
as the Texas Milk Marketing Order. Within the marketing area, price differ by a fixed proportion
from one zone to the other. The price of raw milk is around 7 cents per half-pint.
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tribution route. This distribution route depends on the firm’s current portfolio
of clients (e.g., government agencies, military bases, and schools). Second, the
idiosyncratic component depends on the firm current capacity utilization. If
the firm is near capacity, winning an extra contract may signify employing
an additional truck and driver which increases largely the cost of fulfilling the
contract. Finally, idiosyncratic costs include a firm’s efficiency in packaging,
loading trucks, managing the machinery etc.
If the common component is controlled for, the cost structure falls in the inde-
pendent and private value framework. Further discussion of this assumption is found
in section 2.6.3.2.
A description of the conspiracy as well as the main actors in the industry is
provided next. In 1992 and 1993, nine milk processors accused of collusion in the
DFW market area reached settlement with the State.17 The cartel included the main
suppliers with plants in the DFW market area: Borden, Foremost, Schepps, Cabell,
Oak Farms, Metzger, Vandervoort, Gandy, and Preston. Indictments suggest that
collusion began at least as early as 1975. This paper focuses on the period from 1980
to 1992. The cartel went through the following structural changes: in 1983, Borden
acquired Metzger; in 1985, Preston entered the school milk market and joined the
conspiracy; in 1986, Schepps acquired Foremost; in 1990, Cabell acquired Oak Farms.
Pure Milk Co. is the largest non-cartel school milk supplier in the dataset. The
firm’s main plant was located in Waco, TX (i.e in a different federal order zone
than the DFW cartel). The company was founded in the 1960s and was successful in
establishing a strong local customer base in Central Texas by marketing higher quality
dairy products. Its main raw milk supplier was Dairy Farmers of America, a national
milk marketing cooperative. School contracts made up to 20% of the firm’s business.
17As in Pesendorfer (2000), collusion is thought of as an explicit or implicit scheme designed to
limit competition and increase profits.
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While Pure Milk bid primarily for contract near its plant in the Waco market area,
it also participated in a non-negligible number of auctions for school districts in the
DFW market area. According to the General Manager of the firm at that time, these
were typically larger contracts justifying ”going the extra mile”. In these occasions,
Pure Milk bid against the cartel. The paper focuses on these contracts in which Pure
Milk bid in district where the cartel was operating. Pure Milk’s location further from
the epicenter of the conspiracy may have played a non-negligible role in it not being
part of the cartel. Most of its business was conducted in the Waco market area, while
the cartel was only active in Dallas-Fort Worth.
2.4 Data and Descriptive Statistics
The paper studies school milk contracts awarded annually between 1980 and 1992
in three large market areas in Northeastern and Southern Texas: Dallas-Fort Worth,
Waco and San Antonio. Contracts are awarded at the school district level. Figure
2.1 shows school districts in the dataset by market area. Each school district con-
tains around four to five schools. Initially, the dataset contains information on 1620
auctions, 4444 bids.
The main dataset is the auction data. This dataset was collected by the Antitrust
Division of the US Department of Justice during its investigation of the Texas milk
cartel. For each contract awarded, the following characteristics are observed: the
county and school district awarding the contract, the identity of the bidding firms
and corresponding bids for each milk category (whole white, whole chocolate, low-
fat white, low-fat chocolate, skim milk), the quantities required per milk category,
whether a cooler has to be provided, the number of meals served in the school district,
the school district enrollment, the number of deliveries per week, the number of
schools in the district, whether a bid was fixed or escalated, and the identity of the
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winner18.
Three auxiliary datasets complement the auction data. Two are obtained from
the US Department of Agriculture’s Marketing Service.19 First, a dataset on prices of
Class I fluid milk for the period of interest.20 This is the price of raw milk sold by milk
cooperatives (such as Dairy Farmers of America) to milk processors and distribution
firms.21 Second, a dataset giving the processing plants locations of the firms bidding
for the school milk contracts. Third, the longitudes and latitutes of school districts
is added to the main auction data.
The reduced form and structural analysis are conducted on the data after the fol-
lowing preparation. Auctions with more than one winner are dropped. Auctions with
only one participant are dropped. Prices are deflated using the CPI deflator into 1982
dollars. Finally, a distance variable is constructed for each observed bidder-auction
pair: this variable measures the great-circle distance between the school district and
the bidder’s closest plant. The variable is constructed using the latitude and lon-
gitude coordinates of firms’ plants and school districts. After this procedure, the
dataset contains information on 1, 033 auctions, 3, 488 bids.
Table 2.1 shows that the majority of firms win between 20% and 30% of auctions
in which they participate. Borden and Oak Farms are the largest firms in terms of
contract won over this period.22 In terms of contracts won, Pure Milk (the largest
non-cartel firm) is in the second-tier of the distribution. It won 28% of the contracts
it bid on.
18In some large and densely populated district, several distributors shared the contract.
19Southwest Market Area (Federal Milk Order 126).
20Class I Milk is raw milk destined to be used as a beverage, in opposition to milk processed into
yogurts, cheese etc.
21Note that such prices differ from one region to the other within the Texas Milk Marketing Order.
22Both firms are national, with a larger distribution network.
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Table 2.1: Number of bids and wins by firm 1980− 1992
Vendor # of bids # of wins % of wins
BORDEN 836 232 0.278
CABELL 418 140 0.335
FOREMOST 139 45 0.324
GANDY 23 5 0.217
KNOWLTON 12 1 0.083
LILLY 7 0 0
METZGER 21 4 0.190
OAK FARMS 530 184 0.347
PRESTON 333 98 0.294
PURE 255 72 0.282
SCHEPPS 528 115 0.218
SUPERIOR 46 30 0.652
VANDERVOORT 340 107 0.315
Total 3, 488 1, 033
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Table 2.2 gives summary statistics by market area. Over the period of interest,
735 contracts were awarded in Dallas-Fort Worth, 143 in San Antonio, and 179 in
Waco. Only 15 school districts awarded contracts in San Antonio, against 30 for
Waco. Indeed, school milk contracts in San Antonio are for larger quantities. The
average winning bid (for a half-pint of whole white milk) is greater in Dallas-Fort
Worth, followed by San Antonio, and lastly Waco23. The average cost of a contract is
the highest in San Antonio, reflecting again the larger size of contracts. The average
contract cost in DFW is $85, 115 against $18, 779 in Waco. This reflects differences
in contract sizes, raw milk prices, contract specification across the two market areas
but is also potentially related to inflated cartel prices in the DFW area.
2.5 Reduced Form Analysis
In this section, the bidding behavior of the largest non-cartel bidder (Pure Milk
Co.) is examined. This preliminary analysis provides evidence that Pure Milk bid
significantly less aggressively when facing cartel bidders, and allow a preliminary
assessment of the overbidding.
23Note that for these winning bid may reflect different auction characteristics from one market
area to the other (quantities, input prices etc)
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Table 2.2: Descriptive statistics by market area
Market Area DFW San Antonio Waco
Number of bids 2411 555 591
Number of contracts 735 143 179
Number of contracts/year 56.5 11 13.7
Number of counties 25 7 7
Number of school districts 115 15 30
winning bid/half pint
Mean 0.1442 0.1417 0.1365
SD 0.0214 0.0283 0.0226
# of meals per year-school district
Mean 522,578.2 1,273,001.4 339,188.0
SD 655,877.1 1,436,814.3 620,308.4
Contract total cost per school district
Mean 85,115.37 168,938.34 18,779.90
SD 112,916.49 202,501.19 24,883.69
Note: Bids are for a half-pint of whole white milk. Bids and contract cost are in 1982 dollars.
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Figure 2.1: Map of the counties in the dataset, by market area
Pure Milk’s processing plant is located near the city of Waco, in Mc Lennan
county. The firm bid mainly in Mc Lennan and neighboring counties (see Figure 2.1).
However, in 10% of the cases, the firm bid in further counties, located in the cartel
area of activity. Auctions in which Pure Milk bid are divided by counties into two
separate types:
• Collusive auctions: these are in counties contiguous or close to Dallas-Fort
Worth in which the cartel presence was established by the DoJ. The counties
are Johnson, Hood, Erath, Dallas, and Comanche. Such auctions form around
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10% of Pure Milk’s bids.
• Competitive auctions: these are in counties outside the Dallas-Fort Worth car-
tel territory (they are located in the Waco or San Antonio market areas). The
counties are McLennan and directly contiguous counties: Coryell, Falls, Lime-
stone, Bell, Hill, and Bosque.
This classification is based on the factual statement of the milk cartel prosecution. It is
assumed that the cartel bid in the collusive counties, while all firms bid competitively
in the competitive counties.
Table 2.3: List of variables
Type Variable Description
Auction specific FMO price raw milk price in 1982 dollars
meals number of school lunches per school district per year
escalated equals 1 if the bid is escalated
deliveries number of deliveries per week
number of schools number of schools in the school district
cooler equals 1 if a cooler needs to be provided
number of bids number of bids submitted in the auction
Bidder specific distance great-circle distance between closest plant and school district
bid bid submitted for whole white category
incumbency equals 1 if bidder won the contract in previous year
Note: Indicators for missing values of cooler, deliveries and escalated are also included
The logarithm of Pure Milk’s bid for whole white milk is regressed on the variable
listed in Table 2.3. All continuous variables are in logarithm.24 Quadratic terms for
the number of meals and distance are included. In the first specification, no fixed
24The log-log specification allows the interpretation of coefficients as elasticities. Additionally,
because bids are positive, errors are positively skewed. By logging the observed variable, errors are
made more symmetric.
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effects are used. In the second specification, year fixed effects and dummy variables
for ”collusive” and ”competitive” counties are used. In the third specification, year
fixed effects and county dummy variables are used. Results are shown in Table 2.4.
Table 2.4 shows that bids move closely with the price of raw milk. As expected,
escalated bids are lower than fixed bids (since they are indexed to the price of raw milk
and therefore shield bidders against future fluctuations of their input price). Bids are
increasing in the number of schools to supply within the district. Bids are decreasing
in the number of bidders. In specifications (2) and (3), bids are convex in the number
of meals served (equivalently in the quantity of milk to supply). This would be
consistent with an optimal utilization rate for milk distributors. In specifications (2)
and (3), bids are concave in the distance between the processing plant and the school
district. Distance increases the cost of fulfilling a contract, but with diminishing
effects.
The regression provides evidence that Pure Milk overbid when facing the cartel.
In specification (2), the coefficient on the dummy for the group of collusive auctions
defined above is significantly different from zero and positive. Pure Milk bid on aver-
age 6% higher in the collusive auctions (facing the cartel), relative to the competitive
auctions. Specification (3) breaks down the effect at the county level. As shown in
Figure 2.2, coefficients are significantly positive in collusive counties, while the coeffi-
cients are significantly negative in counties with competitive auctions. All coefficients
are measured with respect to the average bid in Bell county (competitive auction).
The reduced form analysis demonstrates that the largest non-cartel bidder overbid
when facing the cartel. This approach is, however, limited if one is interested in the
magnitude of umbrella damages relative to cartel damages, or in assessing the size
of inefficiencies introduced by the cartel agreement. Therefore, more structure is im-
posed on the data. This structure is derived from the theoretical model of section 2.2.
The structural analysis allows not only the estimation of damages and inefficiencies,
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Table 2.4: Determinants of Pure Milk’s bids
(1) (2) (3)
Coeff. (SE) Coeff. (SE) Coeff. (SE)
Incumbency −0.013 (0.015) −0.029∗∗∗ (0.009) −0.001 (0.009)
FMO price 1.175∗∗∗ (0.068) 1.017∗∗∗ (0.067) 1.062∗∗∗ (0.060)
Meals −0.064 (0.233) −0.363∗∗ (0.141) −0.339∗∗ (0.163)
Meals sqrd 0.002 (0.010) 0.015∗∗ (0.006) 0.013∗ (0.007)
Escalated −0.041∗∗ (0.016) −0.016∗ (0.010) −0.019∗∗ (0.008)
Escalated missing −0.015 (0.018) −0.016 (0.011) −0.012 (0.010)
Cooler 0.004 (0.073) 0.011 (0.045) 0.004 (0.056)
Cooler missing −0.047 (0.067) −0.014 (0.041) 0.013 (0.053)
Deliveries 0.004 (0.014) −0.010 (0.008) −0.006 (0.009)
Deliveries missing 0.063 (0.051) 0.007 (0.032) 0.040 (0.037)
Number of schools 0.006∗ (0.003) 0.003 (0.002) 0.008∗∗ (0.003)
Number of bids −0.016 (0.013) −0.016∗∗ (0.008) −0.014∗ (0.008)
Distance 0.042 (0.027) 0.082∗∗∗ (0.018) 0.115∗∗∗ (0.022)
Distance sqrd −0.005 (0.005) −0.014∗∗∗ (0.004) −0.032∗∗∗ (0.006)
Collusive auction 0.066∗∗∗ (0.024)
Constant 1.587 (1.372) 3.002∗∗∗ (0.848) 3.228∗∗∗ (0.963)
Year FE No Yes Yes
County FE No No Yes
Observations 217 217 217
R2 0.697 0.908 0.934
Adjusted R2 0.676 0.896 0.921
Residual Std. Error 0.095 (df = 202) 0.054 (df = 190) 0.047 (df = 180)
F Statistic 33.214∗∗∗ (df = 14; 202) 72.363∗∗∗ (df = 26; 190) 71.104∗∗∗ (df = 36; 180)
Note: A dummy for competitive auctions is omitted in specification (2). Omitted county is BELL
in specification (3). Counties corresponding to collusive auctions in bold in specification (3). All
continuous variables in log. Prices in 1982 $. ∗∗∗Significant at the 1 percent level. ∗∗Significant
at the 5 percent level. ∗Significant at the 10 percent level.
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Figure 2.2: Estimates and 95% confidence intervals for the county dummies
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but also a finer decomposition of umbrella damages into damages stemming simply
for the non-cartel firm overbidding, and damages originating in the inefficiency of the
asymmetric auction.
2.6 Structural Analysis
In this section, the theoretical model of section 2.2 is estimated from the data. The
objective is: first, to quantify the average damages caused to the school districts by
the outsider firm (umbrella damages), and second, to quantify the loss in efficiency
due to asymmetries between bidders introduced by the cartel agreement.
The estimation approach begins by recovering the underlying cost distribution of
bidders from observed competitive bids. As auctions differ in their specifications (in
the quantity to be supplied, whether bids can be escalated, number of deliveries per
week, number of schools in the district), bids will reflect auction specific heterogeneity.
A first step is to account for this observed auction heterogeneity to obtain a set
normalized bids. Costs are then estimated non-parametrically using the empirical
distribution of normalized bids following Guerre, Perrigne, and Vuong (2000)—GPV
hereafter.
Using the estimated cost distribution, counterfactual bids are obtained by solving
the auction in which the outsider firm faces the cartel. Two scenarios are considered:
(1) assuming that the cartel mechanism is efficient (in the sense, that the cartel
member with the lowest cost bids on behalf of the cartel), or (2) assuming that the
cartel mechanism is inefficient (the cartel bidder is selected randomly from the cartel
members). The cartel bidder is ”stronger” when the mechanism is efficient (scenario
(a)) and therefore the outsider will tend to bid more aggressively (see section 2.2). As
a result, estimates under this scenario will give a lower bound on umbrella damages.
Estimates under scenario (b) will accordingly provide an upper bound on umbrella
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damages.
Under scenario (a), cartel bidder and outsider draw their costs from different
distributions. Equilibrium bid function in such asymmetric auction cannot be solved
for analytically. The bid functions are obtained by numerical resolution of the system
of differential equations (2.3). The method used is the fixed point iteration, introduced
by Fibich and Gavish (2011).
Once the counterfactual bids are obtained, auction heterogeneity is added back
to the bids, to reflect characteristics of auctions in which the cartel bid against the
outsider firm. Damages to the seller (school district) and inefficiencies are estimated.
2.6.1 Data Limitations
Although the dataset used is rich in many dimensions, a few difficulties must be dealt
with before laying out the estimation approach. A first issue is due to auctions differ-
ing in their observed characteristics, such as quantity of milk to supply. This auction
observed heterogeneity is addressed by imposing additional structure on firms’ costs
(Assumption 2). A second issue is related to the relatively small sample size of auc-
tions with a non-cartel firm bidding against the cartel.25 This issue is compounded by
the fact that the cartel mechanism is unknown. This section shows how assumptions
restricting the structure of the model can be leveraged to estimate the variables of
interest (cost distribution, equilibrium bid functions, and damages).
Denote by xd, auction d’ s observed characteristics (such as the quantity to be
supplied, whether bids can be escalated, number of deliveries per week, number of
schools in the district etc.).
Assumption 2 (Multiplicative Separability). Bidder i’s cost in auction d, denoted
25The data contains 250 bids by the non-cartel firm, 30 of which are against the cartel
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cid, can be written:
cid = c˜idΓ(xd)
for some function Γ(.). c˜id represents bidder i’s idiosyncratic (”normalized”) cost in
auction d, which is independent from xd.
Assumption 3 (Independence of costs across auctions). Costs are drawn indepen-
dently across school districts and years.
A detailed discussion of these assumptions’ validity is delayed to Section 2.6.3.2.
The main issue is related to the estimation of the cost distribution from observed
bids. The structural model developed in Section 2.2 requires (at least) two partici-
pants bidding non-cooperatively in each auction. Based on the list of firms prosecuted
by the DoJ, all firms located in the Dallas-Fort Worth area were found colluding for
contracts in that area. As a consequence, it is safe to assume that the majority of
bids for auctions in the Dallas-Fort Worth area (in which all participants were cartel
members) were either (1) a winning bid submitted by the cartel bidder to match the
seller’s (underlying) reserve price or (2) cooperative ”phony” or ”complementary”
bids submitted by other cartel bidders. The structural model cannot be used to infer
underlying costs from these complementary bids (and reserve prices), as most of them
do not necessarily map to a firm’s true cost, but were merely designed to simulate
competition among bidders (or extract all of the seller’s surplus). Auctions in which
the cartel participates are referred to as ”collusive” auctions.
Since the goal is to quantify the size of umbrella damages as a fraction of cartel
damages, a natural way to solve the previous issue would be to use only the sub-
set of collusive auctions in which the outsider firm bid against the cartel. In these
auctions, at least two participants (the outsider and the cartel bidder) are bidding
non-cooperatively. Unfortunately, two reasons make this alternative unappealing.
First, the small sample size of this set of auctions (with the outsider bidding against
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the cartel) renders any non-parametric estimation of the distribution of costs impos-
sible.26 Second, the cartel mechanism (in particular the choice of the cartel bidder) is
a priori unknown.27 One could assume a mechanism for the selection of the cartel bid-
der, and estimate underlying costs from observed bids. However, such an assumption
will be hard to justify. Additionally, if the mechanism is misspecified, this approach
will lead to biased estimates of underlying costs. A more conservative approach is
therefore preferred.
In the preferred approach, auctions from the two other market areas in the dataset
(Waco and San Antonio) are used. As no firm was prosecuted in counties around Waco
and San Antonio, it is assumed that firms were bidding competitively in these counties
(denoted hereafter ”competitive” auctions). By Assumption 2, observed auction het-
erogeneity can be separated from the idiosyncractic part of the bid. By Assumption
3, the set of competitive ”normalized” bids can be used to recover the distribution of
”normalized” costs (the c˜id). Using the estimated distribution of costs, counterfac-
tual bids are then simulated by solving the asymmetric auctions in which the outsider
firm bid against the cartel, for different specification of the cartel mechanism (efficient
cartel or inefficient cartel). Finally, by Assumption 2 (in particular the independence
of ”normalized” bids/costs and observed auction characteristics), observed auction
characteristics drawn from the set of collusive auction with the outsider firm bidding
against the cartel, are added back into the bids. By following this procedure, a set of
competitive auction, and a set of corresponding collusive auctions with the outsider
bidding against the cartel, are obtained.
Advantages of this approach are twofold. First, estimation of the cost distribution
does not hinge on the correct specification of the cartel mechanism. Indeed, cost
26The outsider firm bid against the cartel in about 10% of the auctions in which it participates,
which gives a set of 33 auctions.
27Pesendorfer (2000) finds evidence that the Texas cartel was quasi-efficient even though sidepay-
ments were not used, by comparing it to the Florida cartel which was efficient.
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are obtained from competitive auctions in which no bidders collude. Second, the
cost distribution is estimated non parametrically, as the sample size of competitive
auctions allows it.
One drawback of this approach is that it does not recover the specific cost cor-
responding to observed bids for collusive auctions in which the outsider participates.
Instead, it computes upper and lower bounds on umbrella damages using (1) the cost
distribution estimated from the set of competitive auctions and (2) auction observed
characteristics drawn from collusive auctions in which the outsider participates.
2.6.2 Estimation Approach
The steps followed in the estimation are described below:.
• Step 1: Observed auction heterogeneity
The estimation procedure assumes that the data available is from auctions of
ex − ante identical contracts. This is not the case for school milk contracts.
Indeed, contracts differ in various dimensions, which are public information and
observed by the bidders before submitting their bids. This public information
will enter not only a bidder’s private cost of realizing the contract, but also his
belief about other bidder’s costs.
Haile, Hong, and Shum (2006) propose one method to account for auction-
specific observed heterogeneity. The paper shows that multiplicative separabil-
ity (Assumption 2) of idiosyncratic costs and auction characteristics carries out
to bids and auction characteristics.
Lemma 2. Assume the multiplicative separable structure:
cidt = c˜idtΓ(xdt)
where cidt is bidder i’s cost for contract d at time t, xdt are contract-time spe-
cific characteristics. Then the equilibrium bid function has the multiplicative
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separable form:
β(cidt) = β(c˜idt)Γ(xdt)
This result can be used to account for observed auction heterogeneity and ho-
mogenize the bids. Assume the following parametric specification: Γ(xdt) =
exp(x′dkβ). The first-stage regression is:
ln bidt = x
′
dtβ + ηt + γc + κi + ndtδ + σidt (2.11)
where bidt denotes the bid of bidder i for contract d at time t, ηt is a time
specific dummy, γc is a county dummy, κi is a bidder specific dummy, and ndt
is the number of bidders participating in contract d at time t, σidt is the error
term. xdt include variables for: the price of raw milk, the number of meals
served (and its square), whether bids can be escalated, whether a cooler has
to be provided, the number of deliveries per week, and the number of schools
in the school district. All continuous variables are in logarithm. Note that the
use of time dummies enable us to capture seasonality: for instance, common
packaging, processing and labor costs, that might change over time, but are
common to all bidders.
The first-stage regression is ran on the sample of competitive auctions, that is,
auctions in which the cartel did not participate.
Normalized bids are constructed from the results of regression (2.11), as ln b˜idt =
ln bidt − x′dtβˆ − ηˆt − γˆc.
Since equilibrium bid functions depend on the number of bidders participating
in the auction, the rest of the estimation is conducted on auctions fixing the
number of participants to three bidders.28
28Note that auctions with two participants do not give rise to potential umbrella damages, while
auctions with more than four bidders are somewhat scarce in the dataset.
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The estimation approach abstracts from auction unobserved heterogeneity. The
latter would be relevant if bidders were to observe auction characteristics that
are unobserved by the econometrician. In the context of school milk auctions,
there do not seem to be other factors relevant to firms’costs aside from the
ones controlled for in this first estimation step, i.e input prices, quantities, and
auction specifications (escalated bids, coolers, number of deliveries etc).
• Step 2: Estimation of the underlying cost distribution (GPV estima-
tor)
Following the procedure presented in Guerre, Perrigne, and Vuong (2000), the
underlying distribution of costs can be estimated using the distribution of nor-
malized bids, obtained in the previous step. The cumulative distribution of
bids is estimated using the empirical distribution function, while the density is
estimated using a kernel with finite support.29 Bid data are trimmed in order
to control for the asymptotic bias at the boundaries of the support of the bid
distribution as suggested in Guerre, Perrigne, and Vuong (2000).
• Step 3: Derivation of the asymmetric equilibrium bid functions
As shown in Section 2.2, the cartel bidder and non-cartel firm equilibrium (in-
verse) bid functions, denoted φ1 and φ2 respectively, are the solutions of:
1
b−φ2(b) =
f1(φ1(b))φ′1(b)
1−F1(φ1(b))
1
b−φ1(b) =
f2(φ2(b))φ′2(b)
1−F2(φ2(b))
(2.12)
where Fi (resp. fi) is the cumulative distribution (resp. density function) of
costs of the cartel (i = 1) and the outsider firm (i = 2). Along with the
boundary conditions φ1(b) = φ2(b) = c (lower bound of support of bids) and
φ1(c) = φ2(c) = c, equation (2.12) forms a nonlinear boundary value problem
29The epanechnikov kernel is used. The bandwidth selection method is likelihood cross-validation.
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(BVP), in which the location of the left-boundary b is unknown. In addi-
tion to this latter ”non-standard” feature, the numerical resolution of the BVP
is furthermore complicated (see below) by the fact that the mapping M in
(φ′1(b), φ
′
2(b)) = M(b, φ1(b), φ2(b)) is not Lipschitz-continuous in (φ1(b), φ2(b))
at the right boundary c.
The BVP defined in equation (2.12) cannot be solved analytically. However,
several numerical solutions have been proposed in the literature: the backward-
shooting method was first used to solve this problem by Marshall, Meurer, et al.
(1994) and used and refined in various subsequent papers.30 While this method
is currently the standard for computing equilibrium bids in asymmetric auctions,
it suffers from large instability at the right boundary (see Fibich and Gavish
(2011) for a detailed analysis). As a consequence, an alternative numerical
method, proposed in the latter paper, is preferred. Their idea is to recast the
BVP as a system of differential equations in φ1 and b (instead of φ2) as functions
of φ2. This allows to transform the BVP with unknown left boundary into a
BVP with known boundaries, and apply standard numerical techniques such as
fixed point iteration on a grid. The details of their numerical method, adapted
to this setting are presented in Appendix B.1.
Since the internal organization of the cartel is unknown, in particular regarding
how the cartel bidder is selected for a given contract, two extreme cases for
the cartel internal mechanism are considered. These two scenarios will provide
upper and lower bounds on umbrella damages.
1. Efficient cartel mechanism: the cartel is able to select its lowest cost mem-
ber to bid on behalf of the cartel at the auction. Such mechanism can be
30Gayle and Richard (2008) use local Taylor series expansions of the solution and the distribution
and Li and Riley (2007) use an adaptive step size for the numerical backward integration to allow
better control of the error.
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sustained for instance if the cartel uses sidepayments. Denote by F the
true distribution of costs for each bidder (assuming symmetry), and by n
the number of cartel members submitting bids in the auction. Then the
cost distributions of the non-cartel firm and of the cartel bidder are:
F2(c) = F (c) f2(c) = f(c) ∀c ∈ [c, c]
F1(c) = 1− (1− F (c))n f1(c) = nf(c)(1− F (c))n−1 ∀c ∈ [c, c]
Note that F1 is simply the distribution of the minimum of n random vari-
ables drawn independently from F .
2. Inefficient cartel mechanism: for each contract, the cartel bidder is selected
randomly among cartel members. In this case:
F2(c) = F1(c) = F (c) f2(c) = f1(c) = f(c) ∀c ∈ [c, c]
Estimators of (F1, F2, f1, f2) are constructed from the non-parametric estimators
of (F, f) obtained in Step 2 (GPV estimation).31, and passed on to the fixed
point iteration algorithm. The result of the numerical method are estimators
of the true asymmetric equilibrium inverse bid functions: φˆ1 and φˆ2.
• Step 4: Reincorporation of the observed auction heterogeneity
Observed auction heterogeneity is added back into the set of normalized bids by
drawing from the empirical distribution of auction characteristics in cases where
the outsider firm bid against the cartel. This is motivated by Assumptions 1
and 2.
31The estimator of the cumulative distribution F is kernel-smoothed in order to facilitate the
numerical resolution.
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• Step 5: Damage Assessment
Estimates of damages are constructed by combining the set of competitive win-
ning bids and corresponding counterfactual set of collusive winning bids.32 Es-
timate of efficiency losses are constructed by comparing the winner’s cost in the
competitive and corresponding collusive auction.
2.6.3 Results
2.6.3.1 Assessment of Damages and Inefficiencies
Figure 2.3 shows the estimated bid functions in the case of three bidders auctions.33
Each panel shows the bid function in the competitive auctions, along with the counter-
factual outsider and cartel’s bid functions in the case of an efficient cartel mechanism
(left panel), and an inefficient cartel mechanism (right panel). In both cases, the col-
lusive bidding functions lie above the competitive bidding function as both the cartel
bidder and the outsider bid less aggressively. Note that the overbidding increases the
smaller is the bidder’s cost. Overbidding when the cartel is inefficient is larger than
when the cartel is efficient (see section 2.2).
Table 2.5 presents damage estimates obtained from the structural analysis detailed
in section 2.6.2.34 Estimates of damages to the auctioneer (school district) correspond
to the difference between the winning bid of the collusive auction in which the outsider
firm bids against the cartel and the winning bid of the competitive auction. Damages
32Collusive auctions are the auctions in which the outsider firm bid against the cartel.
33Normalized bid functions are represented.
34$ are 1982 dollars. UB corresponds to an inefficient cartel. LB corresponds to an efficient
cartel.1only cartel damages in the case of an efficient mechanism are reported. For an inefficient
mechanism, these damages are the same as the UB on outsider damages. 2per contract (whole white
only): doesn’t include damages for the other milk categories. 3per contract: computed by applying
the overcharge estimated to the total quantity purchased (whole white and other categories). Pro-
portions of auctions in the efficient cartel case: 33% with outsider damages, 9% with misallocation
damages, 58% with cartel damages. Confidence intervals based on 2500 bootstrap iterations.
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Figure 2.3: Estimated bid functions for auctions with three bidders with an efficient
and inefficient cartel mechanism
(a) Efficient cartel mechanism (b) Inefficient cartel mechanism
are classified into three types, depending on the identity of the winner in each of the
competitive and collusive auction:
1. Cartel damages : these are damages in collusive auctions won by the cartel.
From the estimated bid function, the cartel also wins the competitive auction.35
These are the typical damages antitrust authorities try to assess.
2. Misallocation damages : these are damages in collusive auctions won by the
outsider, when a cartel member would have won the competitive auction. When
the cartel mechanism is efficient, it introduces asymmetry in the auction. As a
result, the outcome of the auction is no longer efficient. The outsider wins the
collusive auction even if they are not the lowest cost bidder. The reason is that
the cartel bids less aggressively than the outsider.
35The cartel bids less aggressively in the collusive auction, so if the cartel wins, it must be lowest
cost bidder.
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3. Outsider damages : these are damages in collusive auctions won by the outsider,
when the outsider would have won the competitive auction as well. The outsider
is the lowest cost bidder. In this situation, damages to the auctioneer come
merely from the fact that, by best replying to the cartel’s bidding, the outsider
is able to bid less aggressively than in the competitive auction.36
Importantly, these damages are computed conditional on the cartel (in the case
of cartel damages) or the non-cartel firm (for misallocation and outsider damages)
winning the collusive auction. When the cartel is efficient, auctions leading to cartel
damages form 58% of the sample, auctions leading to misallocation damages form 9%
of the sample, while auctions leading to outsider damages form 33% of the sample.
When the cartel is inefficient, auctions leading to cartel damages form 50% of the
sample, while auctions leading to outsider damages form 50% of the sample. Upper
bounds (UB) and lower bounds (LB) are derived for outsider damages in the case of
an inefficient and efficient cartel mechanisms respectively.
In auctions where the outsider firm bid against the cartel, the mean damages per
contract in the whole white milk category are between $1, 052 and $2, 019. If the
same overcharge was applied to all milk categories, damages per contract would be
between $3, 906 and $7, 495. For auctions won by the outsider as the lowest cost bidder
(outsider damages) the winning bid is 2.9% to 8.5% above the competitive winning
bid, depending on the cartel mechanism. As a fraction of the winning competitive
mark-up, these damages are between 12% and 42%. For auctions won by the outsider,
while the cartel was the lowest cost bidder, misallocation damages are 3.5% of the
competitive winning bid, or 26% of the competitive winning mark-up. For auctions
won by the cartel, damages are between 5.9% and 8.4% of the competitive winning
bid, or between 30% and 42% of the competitive winning mark-up.
36The situation in which the outsider wins the competitive auction while the cartel wins the
collusive auction does not arise because the outsider bids more aggressively than the cartel.
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Table 2.5: Estimates of damages
Point Estimate LB of 90% CI UB of 90% CI
Mean damage per half-pint ($) - LB 0.00518 0.00447 0.00579
Mean damage per half-pint ($) - UB 0.00982 0.00890 0.01069
Mean damage per contract (whole white only) ($) - LB 1, 052.26 852.62 1, 264.88
Mean damage per contract (whole white only) ($) - UB 2, 019.22 1, 663.09 2, 395.20
Mean damage per contract ($) - LB 3, 906.65 3, 068.04 4, 765.71
Mean damage per contract ($) - UB 7, 495.49 5, 966.52 9, 097.94
Mean damage per half-pint ($)
Outsider damages - LB 0.00316 0.00246 0.00379
Outsider damages - UB 0.00919 0.00815 0.01019
Misallocation damages 0.00404 0.00294 0.00516
Cartel damages1 0.00647 0.00577 0.00713
Mean damage as fraction of competitive winning bid
Outsider damages - LB 0.02996 0.02306 0.03648
Outsider damages - UB 0.08538 0.07443 0.09614
Misallocation damages 0.03538 0.02541 0.04637
Cartel damages 0.05968 0.05279 0.06631
Mean damage as fraction of competitive winning mark-up
Outsider damages - LB 0.12353 0.09412 0.15096
Outsider damages - UB 0.42288 0.37230 0.47661
Misallocation damages 0.26609 0.19664 0.33934
Cartel damages 0.30961 0.27065 0.34453
Mean damage per contract (whole white only)2 $
Outsider damages - LB 655.47 449.78 877.98
Outsider damages - UB 1, 902.96 1, 425.27 2, 378.19
Misallocation damages 812.32 350.07 1, 340.04
Cartel damages 1, 330.21 1, 065.17 1, 599.61
Mean damage per contract3 $
Outsider damages - LB 2, 438.30 1, 539.83 3, 385.41
Outsider damages - UB 7, 074.81 4, 911.70 9, 181.49
Misallocation damages 3, 000.26 952.90 5, 331.35
Cartel damages 4, 937.94 3, 808.12 6, 100.61
Mean inefficiency due to Misallocation (efficient cartel)
per half-pint ($) 0.00394 0.00249 0.00560
in percentage loss 0.03723 0.02494 0.06895
per contract ($) 2, 909.34 747.15 5, 677.51
per contract (whole white only) ($) 788.55 294.23 1, 430.84
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Inefficiencies introduced by the (efficient) cartel agreement are measured by the
difference in the winner’s cost in the competitive and collusive auctions. These two
costs differ only in the case of misallocation damages, when the outsider firm wins the
collusive auction, while the cartel would have won the competitive auction. Inefficien-
cies amount to an increase of 3.7% of the winner’s cost, equaling 788$ per contract
in the whole white category, or 2, 909$ per contract.37
Damages caused by the outsider’s bidding behavior form a non-negligible frac-
tion of cartel damages. These umbrella damages can be decomposed into outsider
damages and misallocation damages, as defined above. Per contract, outsider dam-
ages (conditional on the outsider winning) are estimated to be at least 47% of cartel
damages (conditional on the cartel winning). In other words, the ratio of expected
damages to the auctioneer conditional on the non-cartel firm winning over the ex-
pected damages to the auctioneer conditional on the cartel firm winning, is estimated
to be at least 47%. This lower bound is obtained with an efficient cartel. If the cartel
is inefficient, outsider damages are as large as cartel damages. Misallocation damages
are estimated to be as large as 64% when the cartel is efficient, and the auction is
asymmetric. The estimates found for outsider damages, between 2.9% and 8.5% of
the competitive winning bid, are consistent with the overcharge of 6% estimated in
the reduced form section.
2.6.3.2 Robustness of the Assumptions underlying the Estimation Ap-
proach
The validity of the assumptions made so far is discussed here. The model is cast within
the symmetric IPV framework (Assumption 1). A bidder’s cost can be decomposed
37If the cartel is inefficient, misallocation damages might arise. However they are due to the
random selection of the cartel bidder rather than asymmetries between bidders. If the competitive
auction would have been won by a cartel member that is not selected as the cartel bidder, there will
be loss of efficiency. This type of misallocation is left aside as it is not stemming from asymmetries.
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into : (1) a component common to all bidders, which includes not only observed
auction characteristics, but also common processing, packaging and labor costs38
(2) an idiosyncratic part which is bidder specific. The symmetric IPV assumption
is imposed on the idiosyncratic part of costs (i.e once the common component of
costs has been filtered out). A bidder’s idiosyncratic cost depends on how close the
school district is to its current delivery route. This delivery route depends on the
bidder’s current portfolio of clients (which include government agencies, hospitals,
military bases etc). In the same line, a bidder’s idiosyncratic cost depends on its
current capacity utilization. Finally, idiosyncratic costs include a bidder’s efficiency
in packaging, loading trucks, managing the machinery etc39. Clearly, such factors are
private to each bidder, as they do not affect its competitors’ costs. Moreover, these
factors are fairly independent across bidders. However, one might argue that firms
could monitor each other’s capacities and portfolio of clients, and therefore derive
information about how far a competitor’s route is from a school district of interest. If
this was indeed the case, one way of controlling for such public information would be to
add ex-ante asymmetries across bidders: the cost distribution of a bidder depends of
its plant-school district distance. Nonetheless, the symmetry assumption is imposed.
A first justification is that in the vast majority of cases, firms favour closer school
districts. Second, information about competitors’ distance from the school district
of interest will be more important to infer competitors’ participation decision rather
than to get a precise estimate of their cost.
The multiplicative separability assumption of firms’ idiosyncratic costs and auc-
tion characteristics (Assumption 2) can be tested. By Lemma 2, bids inherit the
multiplicative structure. As noted in Asker (2010), this implies in particular that
within auction, the standard deviation of bids depends on auction characteristics.
38See evidence found in Porter and Zona (1999).
39According to interviewed bidders.
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Figure 2.4: Within-auction mean of bids against standard deviation for auctions with
3 bidders
With an additive separable structure this will not be the case. As within-auction av-
erage bids also depends on auction characteristics, one expect a positive correlation
between within auction average bid and standard deviation. Figure 2.4 shows these
two variables plotted. The within-auction standard deviation varies with the average
bid.
In order to conduct the structural estimation of the cost distribution, indepen-
dence of idiosyncratic costs across school districts and years is needed (Assumption
3). The use of time fixed effects in the first step of the estimation approach help
capture any within-year correlation between cost drawn. The use of county dummies
controlls for within-county correlation of costs.
Another crucial assumption for the structural analysis is that the equilibrium
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derived is played in the data (in the competitive auctions from which we estimate
the cost distribution). In particular, bidders know the number of firms participating
in the auction. While this assumption is usually standard, additional evidence was
found by interviewing managers who participated in the school milk procurements.
According to interviewed bidders, the number and the identity of the firms who are
likely to bid for a given contract is usually known in advance. This is due to the
fact that firms bid for the same set of contracts every year and therefore develop
a good understanding of which competitors will be interested in a given contract.
Information about which competitors are the closest to the school district of interest
also helps in refining their estimate of the number of bidders.
A last issue to deal with concerns endogenous selection in the case of the outsider.
Indeed, it is assumed that the cost distribution of the outsider is the same in the
competitive and the collusive auctions. This need not be the case if there is selection
on observable auction characteristics (i.e the characteristics of the competitive and
collusive auctions in which the outsider participates are systematically different) or
on idiosyncratic costs (for instance if the outsider bids against the cartel only when
the cost drawn is favourable enough). The first type of selection is dealt with by the
separability assumption. Indeed, damages are estimated by drawing from the empir-
ical distribution of collusive auction characteristics (cf step 4). The second type of
selection, on idiosyncratic costs, seems less of a concern: according to the interviewed
non-cartel bidder, the main factor driving participation in collusive auctions was the
size of the contract. Figure 2.5 shows the empirical distribution of Pure Milk’s bids
when facing the cartel (triangle markers). This empirical distribution can be com-
pared to the bid distributions predicted by the structural model. In particular, the
bid distributions of : (1) the non-cartel firm facing an efficient cartel (solid line), (2)
an efficient cartel (dashed line), and (3) an inefficient cartel/non-cartel firm (dotted
line), are plotted. Although of a limited sample size, Pure Milk’s bid distribution
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Figure 2.5: Cumulative distributions of normalized bids for three-bidder auctions
estimated from the data is close to the distribution predicted for the non-cartel firm
facing an efficient cartel.
2.7 Conclusion
This paper examines how non-cartel firms’ bidding behavior can be affected by the
existence of a cartel in a first-price procurement auction. In the case of the Texas
school milk cartel, the analysis shows that the largest non-cartel firm bid significantly
higher when facing the cartel (relative to when facing non-colluding firms).
The structural model shows that conditional on the non-cartel firm winning against
the cartel, damages to the auctioneer (in the form of inflated winning bids) are a non-
negligible fraction of the damages caused when the cartel wins. These results provide
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new evidence on the potential severity of umbrella damages, i.e damages caused to
buyers by non-cartel firms adapting to the cartel supra-competitive price. As shown,
umbrella damages broaden the scope of cartel damages in a non negligible way. The
recent decision by the ECJ allowing ”umbrella claimants” to pursue treble damages
against cartels seems to recognize the latter fact, albeit at the same time pointing
to the difficulty of proving such claims. Assessing umbrella damages is nonetheless
feasible, as shown here in the case of procurement auctions, as long as claimants have
access to prices when the cartel competes against outsiders.
A number of open questions remain. First the paper focuses on the school milk
industry in which contracts are awarded via first-price procurement auctions. But
umbrella damages might not be restricted to auction environments. Alternative envi-
ronments include industries where firms compete in quantities (an example would be
the vitamin market and other similar commodities markets). Investigating the preva-
lence of such damages in alternative environment is left for future research. Second,
in auction environments, the framework presented does not address the potential
effect of a cartel existence on outsiders’ participation decision. If entry is endoge-
neous and selective, in the sense that only firms with a cost realization (or signal)
below a certain threshold enter, a cartel will induces more entry of outsiders (relative
to a competitive environment with the same number of bidders).40 This is because
conditional on entry, the outsider’s profits are strictly larger when his competitors
collude (see section 1.1). This raises interesting predictions, which could be tested in
environments where participation decisions are better observed.
40The two extreme models of entry being Levin and Smith (1994) in which firms pay an entry
cost to learn their private cost, and Samuelson (1985), in which firms know their cost before making
their entry decision. The former features no selection, while the latter features selection.
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APPENDIX A
Appendix to Chapter 1
A.1 Panel of Digital-Projector Acquisitions
Table A.1 presents the observation dates for the panel of digital projector adoption
by data sources. The table also shows the periodic subsample selected. The periods
selected are such that there is a previous observation period 6 months earlier (in
some exeption it is 5 or 7 months). For instance, “May 2012” is selected because
the industry is observed on November 2011. The observation periods selected are
represented in blue in Figure A.1.
Figure A.1: Share of digitally equipped screens and observation times
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Table A.1: Observation times by data source
Date Source Periodic sample
July 2005 Media Salles X
January 2006 Media Salles X
July 2006 Media Salles X
January 2007 Media Salles X
July 2007 Media Salles X
January 2008 Media Salles X
July 2008 Media Salles X
January 2009 Media Salles X
July 2009 Media Salles X
September 2009 Cinego
Jarnuary 2010 Media Salles X
April 2010 Cinego
July 2010 Media Salles X
January 2011 Media Salles X
November 2011 Cinego
January 2012 Media Salles
May 2012 Cinego X
June 2013 Cinego
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A.2 Reduced Form Analysis
This section details the construction of the variable “share of digital screens” for the
art house and commercial networks. Denote by pi the share of art house movies
screened by theater i in 2015. Recall that art house theaters are defined as theaters
with pi ≥ 0.8, while commercial theaters are defined as theaters with pi ≤ 0.2. The
share of art house digital screens in period t is defined by:
st,a
Sa
=
∑
i∈I
pisit∑
i∈I
piSi
(A.1)
Similarly the share of commercial digital screens is defined by:
st,c
Sc
=
∑
i∈I
(1− pi)sit∑
i∈I
(1− pi)Si (A.2)
note that in both cases the share is computed with respect to the total number of art
house (resp. commercial) screens, not the total number of screens. This is because the
analysis focuses on specialized art house theaters (pi ≥ 0.8) and commercial theaters
(pi ≤ 0.2).
Table A.2 shows the reduced-form regression under the logit specification for the
error term. The effect of a 10% increase in the industry share of digital screens in
shown in Figure A.2. The predicted magnitude of network effect is 10% − 14% at
a 50% share of digital screens. The results are similar to the predictions under the
probit specification.
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Table A.2: Share of screens converted sit/Si conditional on si(t−1)/Si = 0 (ordered
logit)
Share of screens converted sit/Si conditional on si(t−1) = 0
(1) (2) (3)
Estimate s.e Estimate s.e Estimate s.e
Industry share of d-screens 4.174 2.276 4.878 2.383 5.596 3.545
Adoption cost -6.160 2.302 -6.437 2.361 -6.873 2.646
Own screens 0.142 0.107 0.170 0.110
Seats 0.301 2.396 0.346 2.633
Art house 0.133 0.257 0.130 0.273
Competitor d-screens 0.024 0.019 0.024 0.020 0.029 0.024
Competitor f-screens -0.007 0.008 -0.011 0.009 -0.008 0.010
Year FE Yes Yes Yes
Region FE No Yes No
market size FE No Yes No
Chain FE No Yes No
Box-office FE No Yes No
Theater RE No No Yes
Observations 1, 563 1, 563 1, 562
-log Likelihood 392.490 373.389 385.241
AIC 818.980 804.777 800.482
Note: ∗∗∗ 0.1% ; ∗ 10%. D-screen = screen equipped with a digital projector. f-screen = screens
equipped with a film projector. For market dummies, the omitted category is “ urban unit - 20 to
100k inhabitants”. For the chain dummies, the omitted category is “single firm and small chains”.
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Figure A.2: Effects of the industry share of digital screens and adoption cost on the
probability of adoption
Note: The effect of a 10% increment in the industry share of
digital screen, on the probability of adoption, evaluated at the
mean, as a function of the initial industry share of digital screens
is represented.
125
A.3 Industry Model
A.3.1 Perceived Transition Kernel
Let P̂a′,a be defined as follows (where the subscript t is omitted and next-period
variables are marked with a prime):
P̂a′,a(x˜
′
i, p
′, s′|x˜i, p, s) = P̂a′,a(x˜′i, p′|x˜i, p, s)P̂a,a(s′|p, s) (A.3)
The first sub-kernel P̂a′,a(x˜
′
i, p
′|x˜i, p, s) gives firm i’s assessment of its next-period
state (including competitors’ total number of digital screens) and the exogenous price
process. The second sub-kernel P̂a,a(s
′|p, s) gives firm i’s assessment of next-period
industry moment. Note this definition of the perceived kernel P̂a′,a(x˜
′
i, p
′, s′|x˜i, p, s)
implicitly assumes that firm i ignores its own impact on the evolution of the industry
moment: x˜′i and s
′ are independent conditional on (x˜i, p, s). This assumption is
realistic if the number of firms is very large, and therefore a single firm has a negligible
impact on the aggregate industry state (and corresponding moment).
The perceived transition kernel for the moment s, P̂a,a(s
′|p, s), is first defined. The
analysis focuses on short-run dynamics (i.e., the diffusion phenomenon) rather than
the (adoption) steady state reached by the industry. The perceived kernel is meant
to capture the short-run dynamics of the industry moment starting from the initial
industry state (y0, p0). It is defined to coincide with the average observed transitions
from the current moment-based state (s, p) to the next, the average being taken over
many finite and short trajectories that start from the initial state of the industry.
The perceived kernel corresponds to the observed frequencies of these transitions
under adoption strategy a. Following Ifrach and Weintraub (2017) (Appendix A),
P̂a,a(s
′|p, s) is defined as follows:
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P̂a,a(s
′|p, s) = 1
L
L∑
l=1
T∑
t=1
1{(plt, slt) = (p, s), slt+1 = s′}
T∑
t=1
1{(plt, slt) = (p, s)}
(A.4)
where T is fixed to the time horizon of interest (in this case, 20 years covering the
diffusion duration, or 40 periods), and {(plt, slt), T ≥ t ≥ 0)}Ll=0 is a random sample of
size L drawn from the distribution of the process {(pt, st), t ≥ 0)} generated by the
adoption strategy a, and initiated at the true initial industry state and exogeneous
price (y0, p0).
The sub-kernel P̂a′,a(x˜
′
i, p
′|x˜i, p, s) can be further expressed as
P̂a′,a(x˜
′
i, p
′|x˜i, p, s) = Pa′,a(τi, s′i|x˜i, p, s)P̂a′,a(z′i|x˜i, p, s)P(p′|p) (A.5)
where Pa′,a(τi, s
′
i|x˜i, p, s) is firm i’s assessment of its next-period state,
P̂a′,a(z
′
i|x˜i, p, s) is firm i’s assessment of competitors’ next-period digital screens, and
P(p′|p) is the exogenous hardware price process. Equation (A.5) makes explicit three
elements: (1) because firms use moment-based strategies, firm i’s assessment of its
next-period state is correct (so (x˜i, p, s) is sufficient to determine the transition prob-
abilities of si, given the strategy profile (a
′, a)); (2) competitors’ aggregate state (total
number of digital screens) is approximated because only the first moment is tracked
(3) the hardware price process is exogenous. The perceived kernel for competitors’
next-period number of digital screens is defined similarly to the industry moment
sub-kernel, to coincide with the average observed transitions over many finite and
short trajectories starting from the initial industry state (y0, p0):
P̂a′,a(z
′
i|x˜i, p, s) =
1
L
L∑
l=1
T∑
t=1
1{(zli) = z′i, (x˜li, pl, sl) = (x˜i, p, s)}
T∑
t=1
1{(x˜li, pl, sl) = (x˜i, p, s)}
(A.6)
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where T is defined as in equation (A.4), and {(zlit, plt, slt, x˜lit), T ≥ t ≥ 0)}Ll=0 is a ran-
dom sample of size L drawn from the distribution of the process {(zit, pt, st, x˜it), t ≥
0)} generated by the adoption strategies (a′, a) and initiated at the true initial indus-
try state and exogenous price (y0, p0).
Equations (A.4) and (A.6) are used to define the perceived kernel for all states
visited over the L simulation runs. The perceived kernels are defined arbitrarily
outside this set. In particular, for non-visited states, the paper uses “status-quo”
perceptions, as in Ifrach and Weintraub (2017), assuming the current state of the
variable remains the same in the next period.
A.3.2 Multi-homing
This appendix presents the estimation and counterfactual results under the “wide
multi-homing” assumption. This assumption stands as the polar case to the “no
multi-homing” assumption detailed in the main text. Setting hdt = 0 for all t, and
defining ht ≡ hmt (so that 1 − ht = hft ), the single-period operating profits under
“wide multi-homing” are given by:
pi(x˜it, ht) = R(τi)×

sit
Si
pid(x˜it) + (1− sitSi )pif (x˜it) if sitSi ≤ ht
htpid(x˜it) + (1− sitSi )pif (x˜it) if sitSi ≥ ht
(A.7)
Under “wide multi-homing”, theaters adopt the digital projection technology solely
for cost-reduction purposes. Therefore, only the difference between profits from a
digital and a film screening (pid(x˜it)− pif (x˜it)) can be identified from theaters’ adop-
tion times and units of technology adopted. Profits per film screening pif (x˜it) are
normalized to zero.
The model predicts profits per screen pid(x˜it)/Si (or equivalently cost-reductions
per screen) between e7, 917 and e19, 890. Figure A.3 shows predicted profits per
screen as a function of theater size and market size. Profits per screen are increasing
in theater size, with a decreasing marginal effect. As in the “no multi-homing” case,
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Figure A.3: Predicted annual profits per screen as a function of firm size
Note: Predicted profits are calculated fixing other characteristics
to: monopolist, non art house theater, not horizontally integrated
estimates point to the presence of economies of scale in operation. The counterfactual
exercise of section 1.8.1 is conducted using the estimated model. Figure A.4 presents
the diffusion paths under the equilibrium played in the data and the counterfactual
best-response (with no intra-firm margin). The qualitative results are similar to
the ones obtained under “no multi-homing”. The results are robust to the multi-
homing assumption imposed because they are driven by heterogeneity in profits across
theaters (which stem from differences in adoption times and units adopted across
theaters), not by the absolute level of profits. The assumption on ht only affects the
absolute level of profits.
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Figure A.4: Aggregate adoption rate with and without the intra-firm adoption margin
Note: The diffusion curves are obtained by gener-
ating 500 sample paths with a length of 20 years.
The sample average of these paths are reported.
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A.4 Estimation: Adoption Policy Rule (1st Step)
First step estimates for the adoption policy rule are obtained by estimating an or-
dered probit model. Denote by Pij the probability that theater i transitions to state
j. Possible states are {0, 1
4
, 1
2
, 3
4
, 1} in the case of miniplexes (4 − 7 screens), and
{0, 1
8
, 2
8
, ..., 7
8
, 1} in the case of multi/megaplexes (8 screens or more). In constructing
the likelihood, one has to account for the fact that theaters cannnot divest the new
technology, and therefore cannot transition to lower states: the dependent variable
sit/Si satisfies sit ≥ si(t−1). The log likelihood is constructed as follows:
lnL =
∑
i:4≤Si<8
1∑
j=si(t−1)/Si
dijlnPij +
∑
i:8≤Si
1∑
j=si(t−1)/Si
dijlnPij (A.8)
where dij is an indicator for firm i transitioning to state j.
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APPENDIX B
Appendix to Chapter 2
B.1 Algorithm for solving the asymmetric auction (Step 3)
The details of the numerical method used to solve the asymmetric auctions are pre-
sented here. Recall that the cartel and non-cartel bidders’ equilibrium inverse bid
functions, denoted φ1 and φ2 respectively, are the solutions of:
dφ1
db
= 1−F1(φ1(b))
f1(φ1(b))
(b− φ2(b))
dφ2
db
= 1−F2(φ2(b))
f2(φ2(b))
(b− φ1(b))
(B.1)
where Fi (resp. fi) is the cumulative distribution (resp. density function) of
costs of the cartel (i = 1) and the outsider firm (i = 2). Along with the boundary
conditions φ1(b) = φ2(b) = c (for some b, lower bound of the support of bids) and
φ1(c) = φ2(c) = c. The location of the left-boundary b is unknown. As shown in
Fibich and Gavish (2011), the system of differential equations B.1 can be recast as a
system in φ1 and b (instead of φ2) as functions of φ2. After this change of variable,
the new BVP is given by:

dφ1
dφ2
= 1−F1(φ1)
f1(φ1)
f2(φ2)
1−F2(φ2)
b−φ1
b−φ2
db
dφ2
= f2(φ2)
1−F2(φ2)(b− φ1)
(B.2)
with the boundary conditions: φ1(φ2 = c) = b(φ2 = c) = c, and φ1(φ2 = c) = c. This
BVP is defined on a known domain φ2 ∈ [c, c]. Fibich and Gavish (2011) propose
fixed point iterations as one possible method for solving B.2. Iterations are given by:
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
(
d
dφ2
+
1−F1(φ(k)1 )
f1(φ
(k)
1 )
f2(φ2)
1−F2(φ2)
1
b(k)−φ2
)
φ
(k+1)
1 =
1−F1(φ(k)1 )
f1(φ
(k)
1 )
f2(φ2)
1−F2(φ2)
b(k)
b(k)−φ2(
d
dφ2
− b(k)−φ
(k+1)
1
b(k)−φ2
f2(φ2)
1−F2(φ2)
)
b(k+1) = − b(k)−φ
(k+1)
1
b(k)−φ2
f2(φ2)
1−F2(φ2)φ2
(B.3)
with the boundary conditions: φ
(k+1)
1 (φ2 = c) = b
(k+1)(φ2 = c) = c, and φ
(k+1)
1 (φ2 =
c) = c. In the case of this particular empirical application, the initial guess used are:
φ
(0)
1 (φ2) = φ2 and b
(0)(φ2) = 0.9 + (c− 0.9)/c ∗ φ2. Although convergence of the fixed
point iterations is not guaranteed, since a unique solution exists, if the algorithm
converges to a function satisfying the BVP, this function is the solution to the BVP.
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